

# W WHAT DO THE FOLK HAVE IN COMMON WITH ORGANIZED CRIME?



OR TAKING THE NORMAL OUT OF AN INDUSTRY THAT KILLS



# **W**HAT DO THE SMOKE FOLK HAVE IN COMMON WITH ORGANIZED CRIME?

or taking the *NORMAL* out of an industry that kills

Non-Smokers' Rights Association  
May 2007

This report is dedicated to the more than one million Canadian mothers, fathers, aunts, uncles, brothers and sisters whose premature deaths were contributed to or caused by tobacco industry deception and to the activist young people who are committed to holding the tobacco industry to account for these deaths.

We applaud this special group of young Canadians who are determined to change the industry's behaviour and who are prepared to dive into and absorb this lengthy report because they want to understand Big Tobacco's predatory marketing and shut off the industry's supply of new recruits.

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# B BIKER GANGS AND PUSHERS IN PINSTripES

**If it's not criminal, it should be...**

**W**e all know that organized crime has deep roots in Canada. Think biker gangs selling drugs, exploiting people and doing other nasty things. These gangs will consider almost any unsavory activity as long as it generates big dollars. Forget decency. Delete conscience. Organized crime bosses operate without any concern for the people they harm.

But what would you think if we told you that there is an industry out there operating just like organized crime, selling a drug to young people and working to ensure that they become addicted? And that it's a drug that is killing close to 40,000 Canadians every year. At the same time, the pushers of this drug, pushers in pinstripe suits, gleefully tell everybody that what they are doing is all perfectly legal, that they have a legal right to addict young people and it's just unfortunate if these kids die a few years later from their addiction.

Sounds like organized crime and criminal behaviour to us. But, if it isn't, we think it should be. As the saying goes, if it walks like a duck, talks like a duck and quacks like a duck, maybe it is a duck.

Regardless of whether such a drug enterprise is a real organized crime industry or a look-alike criminal organization, if the public was well informed about such an industry and understood the impact of its ugly behaviour, do you think Canadians would want governments just to sit on their

hands? Or would a snail's pace attempt to confront that industry be OK? Especially in the face of an epidemic that is killing thousands, year after year after year? Would fair-minded people demand that governments change the rules for such an industry? Or would they want law enforcement people to be able to put these drug bosses in the slammer?

At this point, we suspect you know that we are not talking about biker gangs or the Mafia. We are talking about the tobacco industry. The truth is that the tobacco industry has operated and still operates outside the accepted norms for legitimate, ethical business. And a growing number of Canadians are getting it, even if governments are not there yet.

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When criticized, tobacco manufacturers always defend themselves by saying:

- they are a "legal industry" selling a "legal product" to adults who "choose" to smoke;
- they are good corporate citizens (even though they kill by the thousands). People also die from eating too much chocolate;
- they should be treated like all other industries and welcomed with open arms by politicians, bureaucrats and the public. After all, they donate to universities, hospitals and battered women's shelters;
- they are partners with governments! Did you catch that? Governments are "senior partners" in the tobacco business because, say the Smoke Folk, governments benefit from all the taxes collected from tobacco sales.

These arguments must work because, by the end of every single day, about 130 Canadians die from tobacco industry products. Yet the pushers get away with much of their ugly behaviour, year in, year out.

But there are two sides to most stories, and Big Tobacco has told its side for decades. Now it's our turn. This report is for youth activists. We believe you want to make a difference. So it's packed with the information we think will help you go after some very bad dudes. At the top of our list of important material is this: we are going to tell you why these look-alike organized crime guys – and most of them are guys – are so destructive they make biker bosses look like Mother Teresas in comparison.

# Big Tobacco, a BIG drug trafficker

Let's start by talking about drugs. Biker gangs and the Mafia deal in illegal drugs like cocaine, heroin and ecstasy. Like the better-known organized crime guys, the tobacco industry is also into drug trafficking, but it pushes nicotine. Nicotine, in the doses normally absorbed by smokers, is not particularly harmful. But it is extremely addictive. So addictive, in fact, that the United Kingdom Royal College of Physicians reported that cigarettes "are as addictive as drugs such as heroin or cocaine."<sup>1</sup> You think health officials sound off the wall comparing nicotine with hard drugs? Not at all. In fact, a Philip

Morris scientist was quoted as saying:

Think of the cigarette pack as a storage container for a day's supply of nicotine... Think of the cigarette as a dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine.<sup>2</sup>

As far back as 1963, a lawyer for United States tobacco giant Brown & Williamson revealed the company's inside knowledge about the addictiveness of its products:

Moreover, nicotine is addictive. We are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tobacco Advisory Group of the Royal College of Physicians of London. Nicotine Addiction in Britain. London: RCP, 2000, back cover of printed report.

<sup>2</sup> Dunn WL, Jr. (Principal Scientist at Philip Morris, 1970-80s). "Motives and Incentives in Cigarette Smoking". 1972 (est.). Bates No. 2024273959-2024273975. <http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/2024273959-3975.html>

<sup>3</sup> Yeaman A (General Counsel of Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation). Implications Of Battelle Hippo I & II And The Griffith Filter. 17 July 1963. Bates No. 2074459290-2074459294 <http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2074459290-9294.html>



A legal industry selling a legal product to adults who "choose" to smoke? This is the industry spin. We don't think so. There are serious problems with this statement. First, just because the industry is legally allowed to exist because of a mistake doesn't mean that it should be legal. It is obvious that the cigarette industry is only legal by historic accident. Lawmakers did not know the damage tobacco would cause when cigarettes entered the market. In addition, being legal doesn't mean that everything the industry does is legal. Or absolves it of civil responsibility. Consider just a couple of examples.

- It is perfectly legal for tobacco companies to sell cigarettes to adults in Canada. But criminal behaviour or civil misconduct will be involved, almost certainly fraud, if companies lie or create confusion about the risks of these "legal" products.
- It is perfectly legal for tobacco companies to manufacture and export cigarettes. But it is not perfectly legal for tobacco interests to conspire to sell cigarettes to smugglers or to sell to people who will sell to smugglers and profit from the proceeds of crime.

As we write, several tobacco companies and their executives face criminal charges related to cigarette smuggling. And the federal Attorney General has sued the same companies to recover \$4.3 billion in tobacco tax revenues lost due to smuggling.

While these allegations have not yet been proven in court in Canada, the accusations strongly suggest behaviour that falls way outside the norms of ethical business, if not outside the law. And, obviously, there is much more to that behaviour that crosses the line.

When all is said and done, it does not take much imagination to see Big Tobacco as a drug pusher or drug trafficker. So how on earth does an industry this destructive get away with it?

There is no simple response. But, whatever the answer, part of it must be unparalleled deception, obscene greed and unforgivable callousness.

## What you should know about nicotine

**Nicotine in cigarette smoke is highly addictive and is of concern for this reason. But nicotine is not a significant direct source of disease. The serious health risks of cigarettes are not caused by nicotine but by the chemicals formed when tobacco is burned. If nicotine could be delivered to addicted smokers in a purer form, without the deadly gases and particles formed by combustion, the death and disease now caused by cigarettes would drop dramatically.**

**Addiction experts call cigarettes dirty drug delivery systems, like dirty needles that transmit disease to addicts of hard drugs. Products that contain nicotine to help smokers stop smoking offer clean and therapeutic drug delivery and should not be avoided for fear of illness due to the use of a nicotine-based product.**

## It's a normal, legal industry

Despite this deception and greed, Big Tobacco has spent the last 50 years promoting itself as a normal, legal industry, selling a normal, legal, but “controversial” product. Less-than-ethical scientists, pseudo-scientists and outright flakes were hired to churn out ‘scientific evidence’ and stories to counter the bad press about the destructiveness of its products and the dangers of second-hand smoke.

Journalists purporting to be independent but doing the industry’s bidding have been afforded respectability through publication in Canada’s newspapers and magazines and through appearances on radio and TV. And industry-created front groups like the Smokers’ Freedom Society and mychoice.ca were created to undermine legitimate science and to confuse legislators and the public.

Tobacco companies have also forged alliances with respected institutions and charities and wrapped themselves up in sponsorship of the arts and sports. Their executives have volunteered for the Kidney Foundation and the respected Women’s College Hospital in Toronto, even as the industry contributed to kidney disease and accelerated the tobacco-caused lung cancer epidemic among women. The industry’s so-called philanthropy even extended to the funding of a course in corporate social responsibility at the University of St. Michael’s College in the University of Toronto. Wow, Big Tobacco-sponsored Corporate Social Responsibility!

With unnerving brass and straight faces, tobacco companies have published glossy brochures explaining why kids – the future of the industry – should not smoke. The message over and over again has been ‘we’re-just-one-of-the-boys-doing-our-big-business-thing.’ Or, in a total misread of the laws of business, “we have to do what we do because we have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize our profits for shareholders.” In short, they have spent half a century normalizing themselves in society.

Of course, this is not a normal industry. And, despite the smear by some that all corporations are driven to act this way, no industry has a financial or



*The normalization of the tobacco industry goes back decades.*

fiduciary responsibility to its shareholders to flout the law. Or to peddle a drug that addicts kids and kills half of its long-term users without warnings required by law.

In the process of normalizing their industry, cigarette manufacturers have expanded their markets, deceived the public, and blocked or undermined many of the legislative or regulatory measures that would normally have been introduced to stop a corporate-promoted epidemic.

Now, 40 or 50 years later, with millions of secret industry documents out in the open and with knowledge of industry behaviour in hand, the health community has developed a strategy to counter the industry’s destructive normalization process. It is called **Tobacco Industry Denormalization** because the name of the health strategy says exactly what has to be accomplished. The tobacco industry has to be stripped of the normalcy and legitimacy that for too long have blocked the reforms that might curb its destructive behaviour.

# Tobacco Industry Denormalization – Taking the NORMAL out of an industry **that kills**

Tobacco Industry Denormalization or TID is:

- a public health strategy that tells the public the truth about the tobacco industry's role as the disease vector in the development and continuation of the tobacco epidemic, just as the mosquito is the disease vector in malaria,
- the reversal of the process of industry normalization promoted by cigarette manufacturers for decades,
- the education of the public as to why the tobacco industry is not normal, or legitimate, and why its marketing falls outside the norms of behaviour of legitimate and ethical business.

We might safely conclude that TID is an effective health strategy because it passes the 'Scream Test' with flying colours. The way the 'Scream Test' works is that the more effective a tobacco control strategy is, the louder Big Tobacco or the Smoke Folk will scream. If, on the other hand, the Smoke Folk think that a health strategy is weak and ineffective, they will support it, just like they support ineffective youth smoking prevention programs. The bottom line is that Big Tobacco hates TID. The TID health strategy has been endorsed by some of Canada's largest health agencies, by former health ministers, by Dr. Fraser Mustard, founder of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and by health economist Professor Robert G. Evans. For more information on the strategy, read the Non-Smokers' Rights Association report *Tobacco Industry Denormalization: Telling the truth about the tobacco industry's role in the tobacco epidemic*.<sup>4</sup>



<sup>4</sup> Mahood G. Tobacco Industry Denormalization: Telling the truth about the tobacco industry's role in the tobacco epidemic, March 2004. [www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/pdf/Denormalization\\_English\\_Booklet.pdf](http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/pdf/Denormalization_English_Booklet.pdf). Also available in hard copy from the NSRA.

# Why

## BIG TOBACCO DESERVES TO BE SHUNNED

This resource is intended to help young activists understand some of the history of the tobacco epidemic that plagues Canada and the world. We'll examine some key events that have led to the present death toll of 37,000 Canadians annually, and showcase some quotes that help expose the skeletons in the tobacco industry's closet. From Big Tobacco's outright lies about the risks associated with its products to the aggressive marketing of cigarettes to young people and its involvement in tobacco smuggling, it's a decades-long history of ugly behaviour. There are few industries that have acted as brazenly and destructively.

But we won't just look back. Later in the booklet, we will shine a light on the tobacco industry of today.

After all, each company will swear up and down that it has changed for the better, and is now a socially responsible corporate citizen. However, despite all the public relations nonsense spread by industry executives, we will make the case that tobacco companies haven't changed in any significant way and do not deserve to be trusted. They deserve to be shunned.

You can help with this process. So we will appeal to you to get involved. With the information provided throughout this report, we will encourage you to take on Big Tobacco in your own community. We hope you will be inspired to move beyond simply thinking about the behaviour of this industry to actually doing something about it.


Although much progress has been made, there is still a war being waged. It pits powerful, hardened, profit-hungry multinational corporations against public health officials and social justice advocates. On the front lines are doctors, nurses, non-profit organizations and people like you, an ever-growing number of young Canadians who we hope will refuse to sit idly by while their brothers, sisters, friends and little kids are hooked on life-destroying products.

People and governments often listen to young people when they make a well-researched case with passion and commitment. It may seem like a David versus Goliath struggle. But you've got truth on your side.

Canadians just need to hear about it.

# Big Tobacco will kill one out of two

The trite saying “to understand where we are going, we must first know where we’ve been” is, surprise, true for tobacco control. Today, slightly fewer than 5 million Canadians are smokers, representing about a fifth of the population aged 15 years and older. However, the overall smoking rate has been declining since 1963, when about 60% of males smoked. In fact, in the 1980s, Canada had one of the highest levels of per capita cigarette consumption in the industrialized world.



*Graph courtesy of Rob Cunningham, Canadian Cancer Society*



Sadly, this decline is not occurring in all populations in Canada. For example, some aboriginal communities have smoking rates that are still above 60%. Despite this, we are making progress. It's just much too slow for our liking.

With the decline in smoking, tobacco-caused death rates and the tobacco epidemic will soon peak. After all, the tragic number of Canadians dying today of tobacco diseases is the result of the smoking rates of the 1970s and 1980s.

How did Canada, a mostly educated, developed country end up with such high rates of tobacco use? Even in the 1980s, Canada continued to have one of the highest rates of per capita consumption in the world.

Does ignorance of risk have anything to do with levels of use? Or addiction-related denial? The average Canadian knows that tobacco industry products are "bad for you." But beyond an often superficial level of awareness of the various risks, there is frequently a surprising ignorance of the magnitude of those risks.

For example, smokers may know that cigarettes cause lung cancer but many have no idea that once lung cancer is diagnosed, it's usually game over, often within one or two years. Too few know that 85 per cent of smokers who contract the disease will die. And too few know that Big Tobacco will kill one out of two of its long term customers!

Given the graphic warnings on packages, why is this so? Why are people still smoking? Part of the answer lies in the ferocity of tobacco addic-

tion. But behind the addiction lies a fraud that started in the 1950s and became the core of tobacco marketing.

More on the fraud in a moment but, first, some snippets from Big Tobacco history. A century ago in North America, despite fairly widespread use of tobacco among males, the consumption of cigarettes was rare. Had this level of smoking continued, tobacco use would not have become the plague it is now. However, in the late 1800s the situation changed dramatically. Public health took a double whammy. First, in 1884 James Bonsack perfected the cigarette-making machine. This new device was able to produce 120,000 cigarettes a day. Prior to this technology breakthrough, cigarettes were hand-rolled by humans. The new machine was capable of producing cigarettes 40 times as fast as a human could.

The second development that drove up cigarette use came eight years later in 1892. Safety matches were invented. The matches available earlier had let off phosphorus fumes when lit and had been too dangerous for smokers to carry. Instead, they would light up from fireplaces or gas lamps. This seriously reduced the number of cigarettes smoked. Cigarette use doubled when books of the new safety matches were handed out free with cigarettes.<sup>5</sup>

In the decades that followed, armed with a highly addictive drug, cigarette companies mounted the most successful advertising and promotional campaign in history. Tobacco use sky-rocketed. These corporations were soon among the most profitable in the world.

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<sup>5</sup> Glantz S. Tobacco Biology and Politics, Second Edition. Health Edco by WRS Group, Ltd., 1999, p. 4.

# The ugly behaviour behind the epidemic: it's all about lying


*"Cigarettes are no more addictive than gummi bears."*

James Morgan, CEO  
Philip Morris <sup>6</sup>

Most of us can remember how angry our parents would get with us if they caught us in an outright lie. And because of that positive guidance from our parents, most of us feel real discomfort when we even contemplate constructing a flagrant lie. Imagine then going to work every day and having to lie about virtually every aspect of your work. Yet this is precisely what tobacco executives, well trained and well briefed by their lawyers, were doing year in and year out as part of their business plan.

In the section that follows, we rely on Phil Hilts, a former *New York Times* specialist on tobacco issues, to provide a window into the industry in the 1950s. In his book, *Smoke Screen: The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Cover-up*, based in large part on leaked tobacco industry documents, Hilts tells us what tobacco industry lying was all about. And the devastation it created. <sup>7</sup>

## The BIG LIE



*Perhaps the most famous picture in the history of tobacco control shows U.S. tobacco chiefs swearing to tell the truth before a Congressional committee on April 14, 1994. The Big Lie told that day, "I believe that nicotine is not addictive," became a key element in legal claims against tobacco companies and inspired severe political responses to the industry's misbehaviour.*

<sup>6</sup> Associated Press story in USA Today about the State of Minnesota's litigation with the U.S. tobacco industry. The AP story paraphrases an earlier James Morgan video-taped deposition on April 17, 1997 in the Broin suit, a successful class-action lawsuit filed against U.S. tobacco companies by flight attendants. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/smoke/smoke159.htm>

<sup>7</sup> Hilts P. *Smokescreen: The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Cover-up*. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1996, pp. 6-7.



He explains that prior to the 1950s, the risks of cigarettes were not yet understood by governments or the public. Until 1952, the chief concern of tobacco companies was not of health, but in selling a 'smoother' product that would cause less coughing and throat irritation to customers. Advertising campaigns featured such lines as "not a cough in a carload" and "doctors recommend Camels". Yet, despite the lack of "scientific proof" that tobacco products caused disease, there was mounting evidence from the street: hacking and wheezing smokers. The bottom line: from 1900 to 1950, lung cancer went from a rare illness to a tragic and entirely preventable epidemic.

The situation changed in 1953. A study was published in the journal *Cancer Research* which made tobacco company executives extremely anxious. The research, conducted by two American doctors, involved painting cigarette tar on the backs of mice. In the study, the tar produced cancerous tumours on the rodents, causing one of the study's authors to declare: "This shows conclusively that there is something in cigarette smoke which can produce cancer. This is no longer merely a possibility. Our experiments have proven it beyond any doubt."<sup>8</sup>

It wasn't just the study itself that made Big Tobacco freak out, but the fact that *Time* magazine ran a three-page news story about it. Then the study's findings appeared on the front page of newspapers across the United States. Tobacco company stock took a sudden drop. And the Smoke Folk realized they were in a public relations nightmare.



## Millions of deaths from one meeting: tobacco executives choose a strategy of deception

Two weeks later, America's top tobacco company executives held an emergency meeting at the Plaza Hotel in New York City to discuss damage control. It was in this historic meeting, attended by the chief executives of the major U.S. tobacco companies as well as John Hill of Hill and Knowlton, a giant American public relations company, that the disinformation campaign was planned. The campaign laid out that day would ultimately contribute to tens of millions of tobacco industry-caused deaths around the world. This meeting may have turned out to be the most destructive planning session in the history of business or public health.

It was in this hotel room that plans were laid for the fraud that would lead to most of the tobacco-related litigation that would be filed in the ensuing four to five decades. This includes the landmark lawsuits between U.S. state attorneys-general and the tobacco industry as well as British Columbia's multi-billion dollar lawsuit to recover increased smoker-related health care costs that were caused by a similar fraud in Canada.

Hilts describes the conspiracy to commit fraud this way:

Money was at its center, and public relations forestalled any serious look at the issue or any conscience-searching at the time. The plan was to spend large amounts of money every year indefinitely into the future to prevent, not sworn adversaries, but **scientists and public health officers**, from warning people of a potential hazard in the normal manner. There is no case like it in the annals of business or health [emphasis in original].<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> **Graham EA.** As quoted in: "Beyond Any Doubt," *Time*, 30 November 1953, p. 54. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,823156,00.html>

<sup>9</sup> **Hilts P.** *Smokescreen: The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Coverup*. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1996, pp. 6-7.

One of the most explicit quotes about civil and criminal responsibility that we have seen comes from British American Tobacco, the parent of Canada's Imperial Tobacco. It shows the dilemma that the Big Lie created for Big Tobacco. It also shows that the industry knew that it was playing with fire:

If we admit that smoking is harmful to "heavy" smokers, do we not admit that BAT has killed a lot of people each year for a very long time? Moreover, if the evidence we have today is not significantly different from the evidence we had five years ago, might it not be argued that we have been "willfully" killing our customers for this long period? Aside from the catastrophic civil damage and governmental regulation which would flow from such an admission, I foresee serious criminal liability problems.<sup>10</sup>

## Campaign to create confusion and doubt

In the Plaza Hotel meeting, the U.S. tobacco manufacturers agreed that an aggressive public relations campaign was required to turn back the tide of public opinion that was starting to mount against them. The plan was, says Hilts, to say that "we would never knowingly market a product which was harmful." They also decided to attack the scientists and public health officials who were alerting the public to the fact that cigarettes cause cancer and other diseases. The infamous Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) was established, and the conspiracy by the Smoke Folk to sow confusion and doubt began.

A TIRC Scientific Advisory Board was set up and a prominent doctor, Dr. Clarence Cook Little, was enlisted as its chair. Dr. Little was instructed by

## A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers



Hill and Knowlton to say, "no evidence within our knowledge has yet established cigarette smoking as a causal factor in lung cancer". From then on, it was agreed that PR executives and industry lawyers would screen their own scientists' findings before they would even see the light of day. Little tobacco industry research did.

Meanwhile, tobacco company researchers found not just one cancer-causing substance in smoke, but numerous compounds that cause cancer and a charming array of others that encouraged cancer growth. Needless to say, these discoveries were not made public by the companies. An admission of any hazard would have resulted in a catastrophic drop in tobacco sales.

The manufacturers felt a need to respond. So on January 4, 1954, the industry went public with a major disinformation advertising campaign purported to be "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" in 448 newspapers across the United States.

Then the TIRC followed up with a booklet sent to every doctor in the U.S. called "A Scientific Perspective on the Cigarette Controversy". Promoting the belief that there was a "controversy" in the research was to become a key element in the

<sup>10</sup> Wells, J. Kendrick, III. "New Strategy on Smoking & Health". Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation. 1980. Bates: 680051009-680051014. <http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/38769.html>

fraud. The tobacco industry's public relations campaign to sow confusion and doubt worked for nearly 40 years. Not only did cigarette sales boom during that time, but governments enacted virtually no tobacco regulation that the industry did not want or could not live with. The steadily growing mass of scientific evidence had been reduced to a "controversy" or "debate".

## Inside the labs and boardrooms of Big Tobacco

What the tobacco companies hid from the public is the fact that their own scientists had found that cigarette smoke causes cancer. Liggett and Myers scientists finished experiments in 1955 which concluded that both their Chesterfield and L&M cigarette brands caused large numbers of tumours in mice. By 1961, Philip Morris had its own hot potato to contend with: their scientists had found 15 cancer-causing substances in cigarette smoke and another 24 that helped to promote tumours.

As Professor Stan Glantz and colleagues detail in their book, *The Cigarette Papers*, the tobacco companies failed to release this information to the public:

As with its research on nicotine, the secret research being conducted by the tobacco industry was at least as high in quality as the work reported in the open scientific literature at the time. Despite the importance and quality of this research, little of it was ever published in peer-reviewed scientific journals.<sup>11</sup>

In the 1960s, many of the tobacco companies

believed that they could discover and then eliminate the toxic components of cigarette smoke. Glantz reports that early research by Brown and Williamson and British American Tobacco (BAT):

... seemed motivated by a genuine concern over the health effects of smoking and a belief that, if the toxic components of cigarette smoke could be identified, these agents could be removed and a 'safe' conventional cigarette created. By the late 1970s, however, the tobacco industry had largely abandoned the search and turned to a more defensive posture.<sup>12</sup>

Minutes of a meeting of the worldwide subsidiaries of British American Tobacco, including Canada's Imperial Tobacco, quote a senior tobacco company researcher, W.W. Reid of Australia, putting their predicament into words:

No industry was going to accept that its product was toxic, or even believe it to be so, and naturally when the health question was first raised we had to start by denying it at the P.R. level. But by continuing that policy we had got ourselves into a corner and left no room to maneuver in other words if we did get a breakthrough and were able to improve our product we should have to about-face, and this was practically impossible at the P.R. level. [sic]<sup>13</sup>

Anthony D. McCormick, then Chairman of BAT, said that if the company manufactured safer brands,

how to justify continuing the sale of other brands? ... It would be admitting that some of its products already on the market might be harmful. This would create a very difficult public relations situation.<sup>14</sup>

The debate should have been over in the early 1960s. But the industry's strategy became create a "controversy" and deny, deny, deny. As the evidence grew, legal concerns became paramount.

<sup>11</sup> Glantz S, et al. *The Cigarette Papers*. University of California Press, 1996, p. 108.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid*: pp. 108-109

<sup>13</sup> Reid WW. "Smoking and Health: Policy on Research," minutes of Research Conference, Southampton, 1962. Bates No. 110070832. [www.health.gov.bc.ca/guildford/pdf/149/00015025.pdf](http://www.health.gov.bc.ca/guildford/pdf/149/00015025.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> McCormick A. "Smoking and Health: Policy on Research," minutes of Research Conference, Southampton, 1962. Bates No. 110070818. [www.health.gov.bc.ca/guildford/pdf/149/00015025.pdf](http://www.health.gov.bc.ca/guildford/pdf/149/00015025.pdf)



## Fire the scientists. Turn on the paper shredder

In 1963, at the request of president John F. Kennedy, United States Surgeon General Luther L. Terry convened a body of the most distinguished scientists and doctors who had not already taken a public position on smoking and health.\* The committee found more than 10,000 studies supporting the finding that cigarettes cause disease.<sup>15</sup>

A 1961 memorandum, commissioned by U.S. tobacco company Liggett and Myers, accepted that smoking directly causes disease.<sup>16</sup> However, in keeping with the policy of suppression of risk information, this document did not make it onto the Surgeon General's desk. It was killed by Liggett executives. All such documents were now regarded by company lawyers as potentially dangerous and they began devising schemes for getting rid of them. The only place that findings of risk would be used would be in court, against the company.

When its biology labs were being shut down in 1984, a Philip Morris executive told scientist Victor DeNoble that "the lab was generating information that the company did not want generated inside the company, that it was information that would not be favourable to the company in litigation."<sup>17</sup> DeNoble was fired. And, like so many critical industry documents, his research was shredded or

*\* In the late 1970s, Dr. Terry became an Honorary Director of the Non-Smokers' Rights Association. In 2000, the NSRA became the recipient of the inaugural Luther L. Terry Award, an international award established by the American Cancer Society in his memory. The NSRA was recognized for world leadership in the "Outstanding Organization" category of the Terry awards.*

otherwise buried. It was clear that legal considerations were the chief concern for tobacco companies. The health of their customers was no longer even a blip on their collective radar screen.

The conspiracy to suppress information about addiction and other tobacco product risks, contrary to a manufacturer's duty to warn, continued for 40 years, well into the 1990s. Then the world for the Smoke Folk started to crumble, litigation mounted, and tobacco executives lied brazenly in front of a U.S. Congressional Committee. The lies were caught on video and the dramatic footage was shown around the world, again and again. "I do not believe cigarettes are addictive," lied the pushers.



The industry was in Big Trouble. At the core of it were lawsuits filed by American states which forced over 30 million previously secret and incriminating documents into the public domain. Tobacco industry fraud, conspiracy, negligence and document destruction were exposed for all the world to see. With the illegal activity now out in the open, more litigation was triggered.

<sup>15</sup> United States Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health. Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the United States, 11 January 1964. [http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/M/O/\\_nab.htmq.pdf](http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/M/O/_nab.htmq.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> Arthur D Little, Inc., Liggett & Meyers, L & M - A perspective review. 15 March 1961. Bates No. 2021382496-2021382498. [http://www.pandora.com/PDF/2021382496\\_2498\\_Q.PDF](http://www.pandora.com/PDF/2021382496_2498_Q.PDF)

<sup>17</sup> HHS F. SmokeScreen: The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Coverup. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1996, p. 40.

## Lawsuits lead to findings of conspiracy and fraud

**T**he most significant lawsuits in the world of tobacco control were filed by U.S. state attorneys general alleging conspiracy, fraud and other sins. This litigation resulted in the *Master Settlement Agreement* in 1998 mentioned earlier, an out-of-court settlement totaling US\$246 billion payable to the states over 25 years. Can you imagine how bad the behaviour must have been to force Big Tobacco to settle for US\$246 billion, out-of-court, rather than to go to trial and have the public find out how murderous its conduct really was?

Another devastating lawsuit was filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, i.e. the U.S. Attorney General, against the same American tobacco companies. Like the lawsuits filed by the states, this suit was also filed under the *Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act*. This act was passed by the U.S. Congress to deal with organized crime, in particular, the Mafia. Judge Gladys Kessler's 1,742-page decision, handed down in August 2006, branded the tobacco giants as racketeers. Judge Kessler had this to say about the industry's repugnant conduct:

Put more colloquially, and less legalistically, over the course of more than 50 years, Defendants lied, misrepresented, and deceived the American public, including smokers and the young people they avidly sought as 'replace-

ment smokers,' about the devastating health effects of smoking and environmental tobacco smoke, they suppressed research, they destroyed documents, they manipulated the use of nicotine so as to increase and perpetuate addiction, they distorted the truth about low tar and light cigarettes so as to discourage smokers from quitting, and they abused the legal system in order to achieve their goal – to make money with little, if any, regard for individual illness and suffering, soaring health costs, or the integrity of the legal system. ...

In this case, the evidence of Defendants' fraud is so overwhelming that it easily meets the clear and convincing standard of proof.<sup>18</sup>



U. S. Federal Court Judge Gladys Kessler's decision said that American tobacco companies were racketeers

Despite Big Tobacco setbacks in the courts, deceptive marketing continues in the United States and about 440,000 Americans pay the price for their addiction every year.<sup>19</sup> They die.

<sup>18</sup> United States District Court For the District of Columbia. *United States of America et al, v. Philip Morris USA Inc., et al*. Final Opinion: August 17, 2006. Civil Action No. 99-2496 (GH): 1580, 1586.  
[http://Tobacco.health.ned.edu.au/site/images/resources/pdf/Kessler\\_Final\\_Opinion\\_99-2496-082806a.pdf](http://Tobacco.health.ned.edu.au/site/images/resources/pdf/Kessler_Final_Opinion_99-2496-082806a.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "Annual smoking-attributable mortality and years of potential life lost and economic costs - United States, 1995-1999." *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*, 2003; 51:300-309.



# Action against the pushers in Canada

**A**t the time of the sick behaviour exposed by the U.S. state attorneys and many others, a similar 40-year fraud was playing itself out in Canada. And it contributed to or caused the deaths of over one million Canadians. Many of the companies involved in the U.S. Justice suit were parents of or sister corporations of Canada's three major cigarette manufacturers. And much of the behaviour roundly condemned by the U.S. federal court also took place in Canada. That's why the British Columbia government filed its lawsuit against Canadian tobacco companies, their parents and the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council (CTMC) in 2001.

In the statement of claim, we learn that the B.C. government alleges that the Canadian tobacco manufacturers co-ordinated their positions on smoking and health issues with their American parents and sister corporations, including those which participated in the 1953 New York City meeting. In other words, most, if not all of the tobacco companies in North America were acting in concert to deny the health risks associated with their products.

An example of this concerted effort is the Rothmans International Research Division ad published in Canadian papers in 1958 (see page 20).

The B.C. lawsuit, which may soon be duplicated by a number of Canadian provinces, also alleges that the Canadian tobacco industry took positions that

they knew were false and deceitful, or which were made with willful blindness or recklessness as to their truth or falsehood...

In particular, B.C. alleges that the manufacturers lied about risk, about addiction and about nicotine manipulation.<sup>20</sup>

A British Columbia press release summarized the allegations against the Smoke Folk by saying they

- marketed cigarettes to children, and that these marketing practices have had a strong influence on why young people become addicted to tobacco;
- provided cigarettes to third parties, knowing that these cigarettes would be smuggled back into Canada and, as a result, cigarettes were more readily available to children;
- sold 'light' cigarettes as an alternative to give false reassurance to smokers who were concerned about their health - even though light cigarettes deliver about the same amount of tar and nicotine as regular cigarettes.<sup>21</sup>

Specifically, the Statement of Claim alleges that:

in or about 1962, the Canadian manufacturers each signed an agreement not to compete with each other by making health claims with respect to their cigarettes so as to avoid acknowledging the risk of smoking;

<sup>20</sup> **British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, et al.** Statement of Claim. Supreme Court of British Columbia. Vancouver Registry No. S010421. [www.healthservices.gov.bc.ca/tobacco/litigation/pdf/agbc22.pdf](http://www.healthservices.gov.bc.ca/tobacco/litigation/pdf/agbc22.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> **Ministry of Attorney General, British Columbia.** "B.C. ready for next round in tobacco fight." Press release, 24 January 2001. [www2.news.gov.bc.ca/archive/pre2001/2001/4408.asp](http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/archive/pre2001/2001/4408.asp)

and in or about 1963, the Canadian manufacturers formed the Ad Hoc Committee on Smoking and Health (renamed the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council in 1969, and incorporated as the Defendant CTMC in 1982) in order to maintain a united front on smoking and health issues...<sup>22</sup>

In short, the behaviour that occurred in the United States is also alleged to have taken place in Canada. Now it is the turn of Canadian provinces to demand justice for the victims of tobacco and the repayment of smoker health care costs out of which the provinces say that they were defrauded.



A 1958 Rothmans International ad published in the *Toronto Daily Star* denied there was clear evidence that smoking causes cancer.

## The industry's campaign to make the promotion of the epidemic ***NORMAL***

But if the behaviour has been as ugly as the various lawsuits suggest, why did governments not introduce reforms to curb the activities of Big Tobacco? How have the manufacturers been able to get away with their misbehaviour for as long as they have?

As explained earlier, cigarettes entered the market at a time when the risks of their use were unknown. By the time the risks were known, a large percentage of the population was already addicted. The addiction factor makes it extremely difficult and probably impossible for governments to now ban tobacco products.

But while populations were being addicted, Big Tobacco was also engaged in its ongoing normalization campaign. Its aim was to convince legislators and the public that as a legal industry marketing legal products, it was entitled to be treated in the same manner as other industries.

The normalizing strategy involved:

- financing political parties,
- adding former cabinet ministers to tobacco company boards of directors,
- sponsoring respected arts and sports events,
- placing tobacco executives on hospital boards,
- funding hospitals including, outrageously, palliative care units where many of the beds are filled with the dying victims of tobacco industry products,
- funding university courses in business ethics and corporate social responsibility. Unbelievable!

<sup>22</sup> *British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, et al.* Statement of Claim. Supreme Court of British Columbia. Vancouver Registry No. S010421. [www.healthservices.gov.bc.ca/tobacco/litigation/pdf/agbc22.pdf](http://www.healthservices.gov.bc.ca/tobacco/litigation/pdf/agbc22.pdf)



The industry thus hides its predatory marketing behind this carefully crafted veil of normalcy. It rationalizes its role as the disease vector in the tobacco epidemic by using BS rhetoric like "free choice" and "risky adult pleasure". While marketing itself as a normal and legitimate industry doing

normal and legitimate Big Business things, Big Tobacco lied about the risks of its products, lied about addiction, lied about predatory marketing to children, lied about the risks of second-hand smoke and about nicotine manipulation.

# a word about editorial balance

So, again, how did Big Tobacco get away with this? While all of this lying was going on, the media played a role in the expansion and perpetuation of the tobacco epidemic. Key personalities and decision-takers in the media were addicted to tobacco and opposed tobacco reform and some who simply did not like government control over personal behaviour, blocked pro-health news stories and belittled health officials.

Despite Big Tobacco's proven track record of dishonesty, in the name of balance, tobacco industry spokespersons, flakes, spin doctors and hired apologists were given equal time and space with physicians, health advocates and even surgeons general. Magazine and opinion-page editors accepted and published articles without asking who was paying the contributor and without informing the reader or viewer of the industry sympathizer's relationship with Big Tobacco. We support the intention to seek "balance" in the coverage of the cigarette issue. But

because one side spread disinformation and outright lied for decades, the so-called "balance" in the coverage led to the introduction of a substantial bias in favour of the belief that the "debate" continued and that the "controversy" in the science remained unresolved. Overall, the frequent unquestioned access given to industry apologists was akin to seeking out the views of Flat Earth Society spokespersons whenever space flight was being discussed in the media. Real balance involves giving equal time to legitimate competing points of view.

This is not to suggest that many in the media have not played a positive role in attacking the tobacco epidemic. Legions of journalists have done just that. They deserve huge applause. But greater care by some in the media could have assisted in reducing the illness and death from tobacco more rapidly.

And could in the future.

# DECEPTION IN MARKETING, FRONTS and OTHER NASTY BUSINESS ACCELERATE the NORMALIZATION PROCESS

## The predatory targeting of women

Let's look at some of the nasty marketing that led to these lawsuits. Young women, girls really, have been extensively targeted in tobacco marketing for the better part of a century.<sup>23</sup> But what was just predatory marketing in the 1920s morphed into fraud in the 1950s when the manufacturers could no longer duck the evidence of the risks of their products. The ads in this section are just a tiny fraction of the kind of advertising used on both sides of the USA / Canada border.

However, in 1988, after a ten year campaign against tobacco ads led by the Non-Smokers' Rights Association and the Canadian Cancer Society, Canada passed the world precedent-setting *Tobacco Products Control Act* (TPCA). This legislation banned tobacco advertising and most sponsorship ads.

But American ads still crossed the border in U.S. magazines. Worse, exploiting a loophole in the federal law, Canadian manufacturers reached female entry-level smokers (girls) with tobacco sponsorship advertising. Arguably, sponsorship advertising, because it associated the product with popular events and desired lifestyles, was more effective than traditional brand advertising.

Although tobacco sponsorship in Canada ended in 2003 when the loophole was finally closed, young women recruited by the industry in the 1980s



*This 1932 Imperial Tobacco ad says "Winchester, a perfect blend".*

and 1990s carry on the recruitment of other girls by modelling the addictive behaviour. So the predatory marketing of the last two or three decades continues to impact girls and young adult females today. This occurs even though earlier advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products had been severely restricted in Canada.

<sup>23</sup> **Office of the Surgeon General.** "Marketing cigarettes to women." Fact Sheet. Women and smoking: A report of the Surgeon General, 2001. [www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr\\_forwomen/factsheet\\_marketing.htm](http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_forwomen/factsheet_marketing.htm)



*This 1929 ad for Lucky Strike included the following text: "Instead of eating between meals ... instead of fattening sweets ... beautiful women keep youthful slenderness these days by smoking Luckies. The smartest and loveliest women of the modern stage take this means of keeping slender ... when others nibble fattening sweets, they light a Lucky!"*

In this report are just a few ads out of thousands that show how far the pushers were prepared to go to capture vulnerable female teens. In the 1920s and 1930s, tobacco companies began exploiting ideas of liberation, power, and other values to entice women into the cigarette market.<sup>24</sup>

Starting in the 1920s, the manufacturers marketed cigarettes as a diet aid. To this day, "many more women than men use smoking as a form of weight control. This is particularly true of teenage girls who

may be obsessed with their weight. Many are afraid they will gain weight if they quit smoking."<sup>25</sup>

The creation of an association between smoking and slimness was achieved by including messages on ads such as "Reach for a Lucky instead of a sweet". Another Lucky Strike ad featured a slim woman in a swimsuit on a diving board about to jump. There is a shadow behind her in an identical pose but the shadow is of an obese woman. The ad asks: "Is this you five years from now? When tempted to over-indulge, reach for a Lucky instead." The marketing of these cigarettes as a weight control product led to a 200% increase in Lucky Strike's market share and made it the overall best selling brand for two years.



<sup>24</sup> Amos A, Haglund M. From social taboo to 'torch of freedom': the marketing of cigarettes to women. Tobacco Control 2000; 9:3-8.

<sup>25</sup> Cunningham R. Smoke and Mirrors: The Canadian Tobacco War. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1996, p. 175. [www.idrc.ca/en/ev-28829-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-28829-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)

Canadian brands, including Matinée Slims, Contessa Slims, and Craven 'A' Super Slims, were designed specifically for women by keeping the association between thinness and smoking.

Lucky Strike's owners, Great American Tobacco, also moved quickly to capitalize on the women's emancipation movement. In 1929, they hired several young women to march down Fifth Avenue in the Easter Sunday parade in New York smoking their "torches of freedom" to protest against women's inequality.<sup>26</sup>

The industry also capitalized on the feminist movement in the 1960s:

In 1968, Philip Morris marketed Virginia Slims cigarettes to women with an advertising strategy showing canny insight into the importance of the emerging women's movement. The slogan "You've come a long way, Baby" later gave way to "It's a woman thing" in the mid-1990s, and more recently the "Find your voice" campaign featuring women of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds. The underlying message of these campaigns has been that smoking is related to women's freedom, emancipation, and empowerment.<sup>27</sup>

Here's how one U.S. state lawsuit described the industry's unconscionable marketing to young girls:

Perhaps the most vicious element of this advertising campaign has been advertising aimed at young girls. Nearly every issue of magazines for young girls, like *Teen* and *Young Miss*, includes an advertisement by Reynolds urging children not to smoke. But the reasons given for refraining are not that smoking is addictive, that it can harm or kill the infants of pregnant women or that it causes cancer and other lethal diseases; rather, the reason given is that it is an "adult decision."

The likely effect of these Reynolds ads is that, rather than discouraging girls from smoking, they plant in impressionable minds the idea that cigarettes act as a "badge" that symbolizes entry into adulthood, to show that a girl is grown-up. This belief, of course, is reinforced by ads showing beautiful young adult women using cigarettes.<sup>28</sup>



Canadian ad associating cigarettes with fitness, *Maclean's*, January 13, 1986.

As more and more women became hooked on nicotine, the diseases associated with tobacco use weren't far behind. In Canada, in the early 1990s, lung cancer became the leading cause of cancer death among women, and continues to be so today. In fact, lung cancer mortality for women in Canada rose a startling 405% between 1970 and 1996.<sup>29</sup> Nearly 90% of lung cancer is caused by cigarettes.

Internal documents from Canada's Imperial Tobacco from around 1984 highlight the depravity in the thinking that marketers put into cigarette ads aimed at women at the time. As Rob Cunningham,

<sup>26</sup> Amos A, Haglund M. From social taboo to 'torch of freedom': the marketing of cigarettes to women. *Tobacco Control* 2000; 9:3-8.

<sup>27</sup> Office of the Surgeon General. Marketing cigarettes to women. 2001 Surgeon General's Report - Women and Smoking [www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data\\_statistics/sgr/sgr\\_2001/highlight\\_marketing.htm](http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/sgr_2001/highlight_marketing.htm)

<sup>28</sup> United States District Court, Eastern District of Texas, Texarkana Division. The State of Texas vs. The American Tobacco Company, et al. Plaintiff's Second Amendment complaint, 1997. No. 5:96CV91, pp. 126, 127. <http://stic.neu.edu/Tx/2amdcom.doc>

<sup>29</sup> Cunningham R. Smoke and Mirrors: The Canadian Tobacco War. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1996, p. 174. [www.idrc.ca/en/ev-28829-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-28829-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)



a lawyer and senior policy analyst for the Canadian Cancer Society, points out in his book, *Smoke & Mirrors: The Canadian Tobacco War*, the documents describe ads in creation for Matinée Extra Mild cigarettes. The series of ads was to depict "a typical day in the life of our [Matinée Extra Mild] woman." Here is the description of the creative rationale:

Our woman is front and center. She is unquestionably the star. She is happy and healthy. She is not a physical fitness fanatic, but loves to take part in healthy fun activities. And while she is good at them, she is not a champion . ... As the strategy dictates, her activities are not too strenuous or aerobic. Smoking a low T & N [tar and nicotine] cigarette would be a logical extension of the lifestyle depicted. ... The theme **Feeling extra good. Smoking Extra Mild.** is a reflection of the feeling that seems to be indicated by prior research; that is: 'Even though I smoke, I like to be active and look after myself – so I smoke an extra mild cigarette' [emphasis in the original].<sup>30</sup>

## Women "more neurotic" says Big Tobacco

Both industry documents and industry behaviour reveal a profound disrespect for its customers. One Canadian manufacturer referred to a segment of its market as "ostriches" meaning that, with respect to risk, the "ostriches" could be relied upon to keep their heads in the sand.

One report from BAT, the parent of Imperial Tobacco, the manufacturer of du Maurier and Player's, reveals the depth of the chauvinistic



An ad from the Philip Morris "Find your voice" campaign.

marketing that preyed on women. Passages like this should cause women to go for Big Tobacco's corporate throat:

It appears that female smokers are, or consider themselves to be, more highly motivated to smoke than male smokers and there is evidence that they find it harder to stop smoking. Although it is not completely clear why this should be the case, it may be related to the observations that women are more neurotic than men and more likely to need to smoke in stressful situations, presumably because they are less well able to deal with stress.<sup>31</sup>



An ad from the Philip Morris "It's a woman thing" campaign.

<sup>30</sup> **Imperial Tobacco Ltd.** Matinée Extra Mild Creative Phase 2 Rationale. RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), cited in: Cunningham R, *Smoke and Mirrors: The Canadian Tobacco War*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1996, pp. 177-178.

<sup>31</sup> **Thornton RE.** The smoking behaviour of women. BAT (File B3183) 105501517 - 565. Study of motivational differences between men and women smokers. 12 November 1976, research report (RD 1410).


# Preying on the young

Despite mountains of evidence to the contrary, cigarette companies continue to pretend they don't want kids to smoke. Smoking, they say, is a "risky, adult choice" and that, as good corporate citizens, they have a variety of programs in place to help prevent young people from picking up the smoking "habit". Note they prefer the industry-friendly language, "habit", not the more accurate word, "addiction".

Former *New York Times* tobacco specialist Phil Hilts disagrees. In *Smoke Screen*, he writes, "Unfortunately ... it is not possible to run a cigarette business without actively working the sidewalks where the children are."<sup>32</sup>

Hilts goes further. He uses Canadian court documents for the core of his chapters on child "starters." He makes it clear that Canadian cigarette makers have unclean hands. He writes:

...on the subject of children we also have a sheaf of papers giving concrete detail from the industry's direct work with children, and what has come of it. The most complete set of papers has come from the Canadian sister companies of the U.S. giants Reynolds, Philip Morris, and Brown and Williamson ... Here there can be no doubt: it is not just that children will take up smoking, and the companies supply them with raw material inadvertently ... in the hundreds of pages of advertising documents from two companies, Imperial and RJR-Macdonald, the targeting has not been hidden. They specifically target children above all other groups.<sup>33</sup>



*Joe Camel is an example of ad campaigns directed at youth. The "cool" cartoon character, who always managed to get the hot women and drive the fast cars, was hugely popular with American youth.*

<sup>32</sup> Hilts P. *Smokescreen: The Truth Behind The Tobacco Industry Coverup*. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1996, p. 64.

<sup>33</sup> *ibid*: p. 79, 90.


Hilts' remarks were bang on the money. The pushers were and are after the young. It was hoped that Canada's landmark *Tobacco Products Control Act* (1988) and its 1997 *Tobacco Act* (TA) replacement would slow them down. We shall see. As this report reveals, kids are still exposed to a great deal of tobacco marketing. And it could get worse. Even if, as expected, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) rejects the tobacco industry's constitutional challenge to the TA in 2007, and the restrictions on tobacco advertising and sponsorship are upheld, we believe that Canadians are going to discover that we are still nowhere near a tobacco ad ban in Canada.

The NSRA believes that the industry has been holding back on its advertising to so-called adult audiences allowed by the TA in order to maintain the fiction it presented to the courts about the law. The industry complained to the lower courts and to the SCC that the TA is extreme, that it effectively bans all tobacco advertising and that, therefore, the TA violates the industry's constitutional right to freedom of commercial speech. As a result, the industry argued, the law should be overturned.

If the manufacturers had exercised their right to advertise to adult audiences to the extent that the legislation allows, they would have undermined the fiction about the total ad ban. Once the SCC decision comes down, the industry will have no reason to hold back and tobacco ads will return to the so-called adult media. We believe Canadians will be shocked by how much tobacco advertising is out there. And it will reach kids via so-called adult media, via point-of-purchase displays, from spill-over-the-border ads from U.S. magazines, and from the internet.

Bans on 'power walls' and other point-of-purchase displays may help offset the impact on kids that the expected flood of tobacco ads to adults will have. And kids will continue to be influenced by peer pressure, by parental smoking, by adult modelling in general and by the power of the mini-ads on cigarette packs themselves.

Despite significant declines in tobacco use, smoking in the 18-24 age group remains stubbornly



*During the first three years of Joe Camel advertisements, Camel's share of the under-18 cigarette market jumped from 0.5% to 32.8%, representing a \$470 million increase in annual sales for RJR Nabisco.*

resistant to change. We know kids aspire to be accepted by the peer group a little older than the one in which they are currently a member. If large numbers of 18-24 year-olds continue smoking, it may become more difficult to cut teen smoking.

Of course, tobacco companies around the world claim innocence. "We're not interested in kids," they say with straight corporate faces. However, marketing practices revealed in previously secret industry documents tell a much different story. In order to assess the industry's sincerity and professed disinterest in kids, it is important to examine what cigarette companies have done with their tobacco advertising in the past, both in Canada and other countries.



One example of the industry's actions not matching its public relations spin comes from an Imperial Tobacco Ltd. document from 1970:

Young smokers represent the major opportunity group for the cigarette industry, we should therefore determine their attitude to smoking and health and how this might change over time.<sup>34</sup>

Lorrillard put it this way:

The base of our business is the high school student.<sup>35</sup>

By 1981, Imperial Tobacco's market share for youth under 20 was about 68%, far higher than the company's overall market share of about 45%.<sup>36</sup> In 1988, another company document, "Overall Market Conditions - F88," includes these comments:

If the last ten years have taught us anything, it is that the industry is dominated by the companies who respond most effectively to the needs of younger smokers. Our efforts on these brands will remain on maintaining their relevance to smokers in these younger groups in spite of the share performance they may develop among older smokers [emphasis as in the original].<sup>37</sup>

By 1995, Imperial's overall market share had risen to 67%. Clearly, the attraction of young people

to Imperial Tobacco's brands has been a major contributor to the company's market-share growth.<sup>38</sup> And there are many more juicy examples of the cigarette companies being more honest, at least internally, about to which age group their marketing should be targeted:

I.T.L. has always focused its efforts on new smokers [adolescent starters] believing that early perceptions tend to stay with them throughout their lives. I.T.L. clearly dominates the young adult market today and stands to prosper as these smokers age and as it maintains its highly favorable youthful preference.<sup>39</sup>

Marketing activities have historically been and continue to be targeted at young smokers due to their greater propensity to change brands.<sup>40</sup>



This web site graphic from the *Extreme Music & Sports Series* run by Canada's JTI-Macdonald was clearly targeting youth.

<sup>34</sup> Imperial Tobacco Ltd. 1971 *Marketing plans*, p. 11. Exhibit AG-201, RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General).

<sup>35</sup> Ashley TL. Lorrillard Tobacco. Bates No. 03537131. 30 August 1978. <http://tobaccoredocuments.org/landman/183432.html>

<sup>36</sup> Harris JR. 1990. Cigarette advertising and promotion in Canada: effects on cigarette smoking and public health. Exhibit AG-196, RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General). Aug. Expert Report.

<sup>37</sup> Imperial Tobacco Ltd. circa 1987. Overall market conditions - F88, p. 6. Exhibit AG-214, RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General).

<sup>38</sup> Cunningham R. *Smoke & Mirrors: The Canadian tobacco war*. Ottawa, Ontario: International Development Research Centre, 1996, p. 170.

<sup>39</sup> Imperial Tobacco Ltd. Untitled slide presentation on the Canadian tobacco industry, p. 12. Bates No. 20182509, 1989. <http://test.library.utoronto.ca/ftp/ncb20a99/kmh20a99.pdf>

<sup>40</sup> Imperial Tobacco Ltd. Trademark strategies and projects: Market strategy and development, p. 47. Bates No. 018110. Exhibit D-176, JTI-Macdonald Corp., et al v. Attorney General of Canada, Quebec Superior Court, December 13, 2002. [www.smoke-free.ca/default.asp?ID=176&JTI441-TrademarkStrategiesAndProspects-1995.pdf](http://www.smoke-free.ca/default.asp?ID=176&JTI441-TrademarkStrategiesAndProspects-1995.pdf)

While swearing publicly that the company was not interested in kids, here is what R.J. Reynolds was saying privately:

At the outset, it should be said that we are presently, and I believe unfairly, constrained from directly promoting cigarettes to the youth market...

Realistically, if our company is to survive and prosper, over the long term, we must get our share of the youth market. In my opinion, this will require new brands tailored to the youth market.<sup>41</sup>

It's clear from the totality of evidence available that the tobacco companies recognize the fact that if they don't addict youth to nicotine early, they may never become customers. Research suggests that 85% of smokers start before their 19th birthday. If they don't start before that, they likely never will.<sup>42</sup>

In the United States during the 1980s, there was a steady movement of cigarette ads into youth-oriented publications. Magazines which focused on sex, entertainment and sports had the highest concentration of cigarette ads.<sup>43</sup>

One example of how important the industry sees the youth and young adult market is found in the amount it was paying, up until 2005, the Student Federation of the University of Ottawa to display its products prominently at point-of-sale in the student-run convenience store. In corner stores and gas bars across Canada, tobacco industry product 'power walls' dominate the visual in-store landscape. Many convenience store owners in Canada are paid about \$1,500 for that prime retail location behind the cash register.<sup>44</sup> Yet at Ottawa U, tobacco companies

were paying \$7,500 for this location, five times as much as they were paying regular retailers.<sup>45</sup>

Bombarded by the most sophisticated marketing in the world and believing that cigarettes are a badge symbolizing entry into adulthood, it is no surprise that so many young people get hooked on tobacco industry products. And while there are serious advertising restrictions in Canada, the tobacco industry here is still interested in the young. And it still has enough marketing freedom to get its messages out.



*Wall-to-wall cigarette displays next to the candy normalize Canada's No. 1 cause of preventable disease and death.*

<sup>41</sup> Teague CE. Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth Market. R.J. Reynolds draft paper. 2 February, 1973. Bates No. 502987407-502987418. [http://www2.tobaccodocuments.org/ftc\\_rjr/CX000043.pdf](http://www2.tobaccodocuments.org/ftc_rjr/CX000043.pdf)

<sup>42</sup> Health Canada. "Tobacco: Youth Zone: The Scoop About Smoking: It's never going to happen to me". Taken from [http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/tobac-tabac/youth-jeunes/scoop-primeur/never-jamais/index\\_e.html](http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/tobac-tabac/youth-jeunes/scoop-primeur/never-jamais/index_e.html), January 2007.


<sup>43</sup> United States District Court, Eastern District of Texas, Texarkana Division. The State of Texas vs. The American Tobacco Company, et al. Plaintiff's Second Amendment complaint, April 7, 1997. No. 5:96CV91 at 51. <http://stic.neu.edu/Tx/2amdcom.doc>.

<sup>44</sup> AC Nielsen estimates the average convenience store receives \$1,500 in listing allowances for stocking tobacco products. "The influence of tobacco powerwall advertising on children," Non-Smokers' Rights Association/Smoking and Health Action Foundation, March, 2005. [www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/pdf/Tobacco\\_Powerwalls.pdf](http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/pdf/Tobacco_Powerwalls.pdf)

<sup>45</sup> President and Treasurer of the Student Federation of the University of Ottawa. Personal communication, 2005.



# Using **MUSIC** to peddle cigarettes



**T**obacco companies have encouraged musicians to prostitute themselves by selling cigarettes to youth. For those musicians involved, it hasn't been their finest hours.

In 2006 at the tobacco-sponsored Wakefest in Kelowna, British Columbia, musical headliners included Metric and The Sam Roberts Band. Yet cigarette companies say they're not interested in attracting young smokers. Just like diaper salesmen are not interested in babies.

The bar scene has been a recent focus for Big Tobacco in Canada. Seductive and fit young women

and men have been used as walking, talking, flirtatious cigarette salespeople. Tobacco companies score big when young people, old enough to start partying in bars, are hooked on cigarettes. These addicts then serve as the models to which younger people look up. If the companies can get cigarettes into the hands of hip, young club-goers, chances are good that teenagers interested in appearing older and cool will also want to smoke.



*Canadian tobacco companies switched to music sponsorship advertising after brand advertising was banned in 1988.*



*A du Maurier cigarette girl  
in a Canadian nightclub*

In 2004, a U.S. subsidiary of British American Tobacco (the same multinational that owns Imperial Tobacco Canada) was ordered to recall thousands of cigarette packages after an advertising campaign was found to target children. The hip-hop inspired Kool ads were "a shameless attempt to market Kool cigarettes to children and teenagers, particularly African-American youth," said New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, the man who initiated the court proceedings against Brown and Williamson.<sup>46</sup> Part of the Kool Mixx ad campaign featured a "coast to coast", "head to head" fierce national clash of the hottest rising DJs.



The campaign was re-jigged and returned in 2005 as Kool's New Jazz Philosophy Tour, featuring well-known black artists Busta Rhymes, Floetry, John Legend, Common and De La Soul. There were three different types of hip Jazz concerts playing in 13 U.S. cities. The tour hit most cities twice, once in the summer and once in the fall. The 2006 tour featured Talib Kweli, The Roots and Pharcyde.



Using music to sell cigarettes is a strategy employed around the world. In 1993, a tobacco-sponsored tribute to Bob Marley was held at the University of Dakar in Senegal. In 1999, the Salem Cool Planet tour brought big names such as Jewel and Savage Garden to Malaysia. U.S. rap star Missy Elliott has also played in Indonesia on behalf of Big Tobacco.

In 2000, Greg Winter of the *New York Times* reported that Philip Morris sponsored a concert in a 30,000-seat arena in Niger.

<sup>46</sup> BBC News. "US hip-hop cigarette ads halted," June 18, 2004. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3817463.stm>



*Young twin boys wear their Marlboro concert t-shirts in Dakar*

Winter interviewed youth who were present. Here is how one young person described what took place:

"I got a pack," said Hachimou Isaka, a 15-year-old in Niamey, Niger where giving tobacco to minors is prohibited. Through a radio contest last April, Hachimou won tickets to a concert that Philip Morris sponsored in a 30,000-seat arena, the country's biggest. To his great delight, Hachimou said women only slightly older than he was doled out packs of Bond Street, one Philip Morris overseas brand, along with hats and T-shirts, to thousands of fans.

"There were a lot of kids, so many that I could not count," Hachimou said, estimating that some were as young as 10. "All the spectators got some cigarettes," he said.

"We were really happy," he said. "We were clapping because we got free cigarettes. I would go again. I love smoking. I love cigarettes." <sup>47</sup>

The star of the concert was Pierrette Adams, a Congolese singer beloved throughout West Africa. She is also the wife of Florentin Duarte, director of Philip Morris in Niger, who was at the concert in an unofficial capacity, watching with the rest of the crowd.



*The Benson & Hedges Gold Club Series brought in some of the biggest names in electronic music to play in Canadian nightclubs.*

How the parent companies and sister corporations of our Canadian tobacco giants conduct their marketing elsewhere speaks eloquently about the corporate ethics that the industry will bring to its marketing efforts in Canada if given the chance.

<sup>47</sup> Winter G. "Enticing third world youth; big tobacco is accused of crossing an age limit." New York Times, August 24, 2001. <http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10D12F839550C778EDDA10894D9404482>



# Big Tobacco on Campus

There are at least three problems associated with Big Tobacco activities on campus. One is the normalization of tobacco industry products and the recruitment of new youth smokers. The second involves tobacco industry funding of universities, and colleges, whether this is through straight philanthropy, research grants, equipment or infrastructure donations, academic mentorships, event sponsorship, scholarships, advertising in student media, or payments for sales or product placement in campus stores.

The third problem is university investment in the industry, which has led to efforts by the health community to persuade educational institutions to get rid of their tobacco stocks (tobacco divestment). All are very serious problems and need to be addressed. Yet both students and administrations of post-secondary institutions seem hardly aware that these tobacco/health issues exist. Or if they are aware, they don't seem to care.

With respect to tobacco marketing, universities and colleges are of great importance to the tobacco industry, for good reason. These institutions are crucial to the Smoke Folk. College students are forming attitudes about tobacco products which could provide the manufacturers with a lifetime of profits from each addicted student.

The manufacturers also know that key recruitment times are often "transition" times, in this case leaving home and going off to the almost complete independence of a college/university setting.

## Examination of tobacco documents shows

industry marketers encourage solidification of smoking habits and increases in consumption [by expanding the market of recruits] by focusing on key transition periods when young adults adopt new behaviours – such as entering a new workplace, school or the military – and, especially, by focusing on leisure and social activities.<sup>48</sup>

Other factors make post-secondary schools important to the Smoke Folk. A university/college community is largely in one area and allows focused recruitment. Student alternative media can be used and the same media is in desperate need of revenue.

Also of great importance, university and college students are the role models that younger kids aspire to become. By recruiting young adults in college, the pushers send the best marketing message possible to an even younger demographic, younger teens. Of course, cigarette makers are well aware that 20-24 year-olds have the highest smoking rate in Canada at 26%.

Finally, say Physicians for a Smoke-free Canada (PSC), post-secondary students are the future opinion leaders who will set and shape the limits of future tobacco control policy. And "Campus tobacco marketing helps to normalize tobacco ..." <sup>49</sup>

Funding of universities and college is a separate matter. Historically, universities and colleges have

<sup>48</sup> Ling PM, Glantz S.A. Why and how the tobacco industry sells cigarettes to young adults: Evidence from industry documents. *American Journal of Public Health*, 2002; 92; pp. 908-916.

<sup>49</sup> Physicians for a Smoke-free Canada. Tobacco on campus: Tobacco control policies among universities and colleges in Canada. August 2004, p.7. [www.smoke-free.ca/campus/Tobacco%20Control%20on%20Campus-%20Final%20Report.pdf](http://www.smoke-free.ca/campus/Tobacco%20Control%20on%20Campus-%20Final%20Report.pdf)

been centres for and drivers of social change on many issues. However, although important tobacco-related research has originated on campus, universities have not led the way in the fight against the destructive corporate-driven tobacco epidemic. Tobacco industry funding is one reason why.

So what does the money do and how much is spent? Using Canada's market leader as a gauge, in 2004, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited donated \$1,655,850 to post-secondary institutions. Such a contribution sanitizes and normalizes the industry and buys leverage. Rob Pritchard, a former president of the University of Toronto, while at U of T, sat on the board of Imasco Limited, the holding company that, at the time, owned 100 per cent of Imperial Tobacco Ltd. UK-based BAT controlled Imasco and forced global tobacco-related policies on its Canadian subsidiary. In turn, Imasco tightly controlled and, in many respects, ran Imperial Tobacco Limited while Imperial denied its products were addictive or caused disease and while Pritchard sat on Imasco's board.

Pritchard's company, Imasco, obediently followed the BAT parent's line which included a great deal of anti-science, anti-truth activity. Yet, when pressed to leave the Imasco board by professors at the University of Toronto and by physicians at the internationally renowned Sick Kids Hospital in Toronto, Pritchard refused to budge. While he was with Imasco, we never expected to see the University of Toronto president take a pro-health stand on a tobacco-related issue. Is it a mere coincidence that Purdy Crawford, then chairman of Imasco, sat on the U of T presidential search committee when Pritchard was appointed as president?

Another example: would a dean of medicine go on record in opposition to tobacco funding for medical research if he had members of his faculty who were receiving such funding? Not likely. Whether it's hush money or not, tobacco dollars buy silence in many quarters. Because an institution that accepts tobacco donations or payments in any form will not turn around and bite the hand that feeds it

by providing institutional support for health strategies in opposition to the tobacco industry.

Here's another example. In December 2000, the UK University of Nottingham accepted a donation from British American Tobacco to fund a centre for the study of business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR). BAT now owns Canada's Imperial Tobacco outright. The revelation that a university would accept funding from a tobacco company for the teaching of ethics and corporate responsibility created a scandal. The expressions of outrage led to international condemnation of the university.

The editor of the British Medical Journal (BMJ), a professor of medicine at Nottingham, resigned in protest. The prestigious BMJ editorialized against the CSR donation. A cancer research team relocated in disgust. The top student of the year at Nottingham refused to accept his award.

Closer to home, with tobacco companies explicitly shunned by all ethical investment funds and with the Nottingham experience staring it in the face, why would the University of St. Michael's College in the University of Toronto accept an Imperial Tobacco donation of \$150,000 to fund a course in business ethics and corporate social responsibility? Why indeed?

Despite press conferences condemning the St. Michael's move and renowned academics and teachers of ethics connected to the course resigning over the tobacco money, the president of St. Michael's never answered that question. But, he gave an outstanding impersonation of a tobacco executive reciting tobacco industry lines in response to the media. The BMJ editorial put it this way:

The acceptance of funding provides these companies with respectability by association; **recipients may also act as de facto spokespersons for the industry, defending its interests**, or, moresubtly, remaining silent on issues that may impact negatively on the industry.

This helps maintain the 'legitimacy' of this industry and its products. [emphasis added]<sup>50</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Cohen JE. Universities and tobacco money. BMJ 2001; 323: 1-2. <http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/323/7303/1>



Worse, when the CSR course director wanted to include this controversy in his ethics course outline, St. Michael's authorities blocked the Imperial Tobacco case study from being discussed. So through a donation to the ethics programme, Imperial managed to control the course content and prevent Big Tobacco from being part of the course curriculum. The bottom line is that this case study shows why tobacco money can be a threat to academic freedom.

In 2002-2003 the Non-Smokers' Rights Association waged a six months-long campaign against Imperial Tobacco's donation to St. Michael's College. Part of the NSRA's "Take Big Tobacco Out of Universities" Campaign included a 4-page advertisement in the University of Toronto's student newspaper, *The Varsity*.

[www.nsra-dnf.ca/cms/file/pdf/TheVarsityAdFINALFeb242003.pdf](http://www.nsra-dnf.ca/cms/file/pdf/TheVarsityAdFINALFeb242003.pdf).

The Québec Coalition for Tobacco Control has written a valuable report on tobacco industry donations, "How taking money from the tobacco industry helps sell more cigarettes, and costs more lives." [www.cqct.qc.ca/Documents\\_docs/DOCU\\_2003/DOCU\\_03\\_05\\_00\\_DonsENG.PDF](http://www.cqct.qc.ca/Documents_docs/DOCU_2003/DOCU_03_05_00_DonsENG.PDF)

The survey report published by PSC mentioned earlier in this section includes guidelines for implementing tobacco policy on campus as well as draft policy templates for tobacco marketing restrictions and prohibiting donations and grants from the tobacco industry. It even has a "tobacco harm calculator". You can tailor your campaign by figuring out the number of students who will die prematurely from using tobacco industry products. There is also a list of useful websites included.

## Tobacco divestment drives Big Tobacco wild

The third issue is divestment. And five words sum up the issue. "Death is a bad investment."<sup>51</sup> As explained earlier, post-secondary schools receive millions through donations and other means. Just like individuals concerned about protecting their money for the future, schools try to increase the money entrusted to them. Unfortunately, through investments in the tobacco industry, post-secondary schools are supporting the tobacco epidemic.

Tobacco divestment is the policy whereby boards of directors or trustees of public and/or non-profit organizations sell their tobacco securities in their pension, endowment and investment accounts. The purpose of such a policy is to stop profiting from the sale of tobacco and to prevent the organization from supporting an industry whose goals conflict with the principles and goals of the institution. In the case of hospitals, the goals would be the maintenance of health and healing of the sick. With universities, the conflict would be with the university's pursuit of truth and the public interest.

The tobacco divestment movement is quickly gaining momentum in the name of social and ethical responsibility. The University of Michigan, Johns Hopkins University, The City University of New York and the Harvard School of Public Health are just a few of the American schools that have divested. A 2004 Canadian survey found no universities and only two colleges that had policies related to investing in Big Tobacco.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>51</sup> **The Campaign Against Transnational Tobacco.** Death is a bad investment: The tobacco industry, corporate power, and your school's money. A divestment action guide. [www.bigtabaccosucks.org/home/center.html](http://www.bigtabaccosucks.org/home/center.html)

<sup>52</sup> **Physicians for a Smoke-free Canada.** Tobacco on campus: Tobacco control policies among universities and colleges in Canada. August 2004. [www.smoke-free.ca/campus/Tobacco%20Control%20on%20Campus-%20Final%20Report.pdf](http://www.smoke-free.ca/campus/Tobacco%20Control%20on%20Campus-%20Final%20Report.pdf)



## POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR ST. MICHAEL'S COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



☐ **DONOR:** Neo-Nazi Party  
**PROGRAM:** Race Relations Forum



☐ **DONOR:** Ku Klux Klan  
**PROGRAM:** African Studies Workshop



☐ **DONOR:** Slobodan Milosevic  
**PROGRAM:** Human Rights Legislation



☒ **DONOR:** Tobacco Industry  
**PROGRAM:** Study of Corporate Ethics

After thinking rather long, nor hard, the leadership at the University of St. Michael's College decided to accept a donation from a disreputable (albeit legal) source: the tobacco industry. What's more, they used the donation, from an industry with a decades-long record of lying about the addictiveness and deadliness of its products, to fund a course in corporate ethics. That's right, Corporate Ethics. To find out more, read the following three pages, and help put a stop to the St. Mike's partnership with the tobacco industry. Because ethics, universities and Big Tobacco just don't mix.

**TAKE BIG TOBACCO OUT OF UNIVERSITIES**

*NSRA ad published in The Varsity, University  
of Toronto, February 24 and March 31, 2003.*

Many have made the ethics case for tobacco divestment but the U.S.-based Tobacco Divestment Project nails it:

**Make no mistake, those who invest in tobacco companies securities ... are performing necessary services for the tobacco companies.** They are providing the nicotine pushers with the social respect, and the financial and political muscle, that enables them to fight off attempts at effective regulation. We are here to say that **if aggressive marketing of cigarettes and other tobacco products is a great evil, and it is, then collaborating with these marketers is also a great evil. ...**

Whether the profits come in the form of common share dividends, or junk bond interest, or partnership distributions – or from the appreciation in the value of these securities as the industry successfully dodges lawsuits and regulatory efforts – they are the result of the companies' success in expanding or at least maintaining the markets for their destructive products.

**The investors in these companies are not innocents. They are not fooled for one moment about what gives their investments value. And when a proposal comes along that would protect the public but threaten the value of their investments, they can be relied upon to oppose it decisively.** [emphasis added]<sup>53</sup>

**NEWS FLASH** – As this report goes to print, a major breakthrough in tobacco divestment was announced at the University of Toronto. Under the leadership of U of T President David Naylor and in response to a Campaign by a student group called E-BUTT, the university decided to divest of tobacco stocks. See the description of E-BUTT later in this report.

We predict that U of T's sudden turnaround in its relationship with the tobacco industry under its new president will lead to similar decisions at uni-

versities across Canada. As we write, the University of Alberta is reviewing its policy on tobacco stock ownership. The U of A medical school has voted to ban the acceptance of tobacco industry-funded research.

Some critics use the "slippery slope" argument to defend their investments in the tobacco industry. They say, "What's next after tobacco? Trans fats? Alcohol?" Nonsense! The tobacco industry causes unparalleled harm, and this needs to be recognized when schools make investment decisions. We are not aware of a single ethical mutual fund that does not screen out tobacco company stock. There is no slippery slope that will wreak financial havoc on the university. There may be some ethical issues that should be debated. But that is one of the purposes of universities. Doing what is right should not be avoided because it could expose other unethical practices which should be corrected.

Universities and colleges should model the principles in ethics that they encourage their students to practise after graduation. Governing one's behaviour by the minimal standard dictated by what is merely legal is not a good enough standard for ethical behaviour in universities and colleges.

## Candy-flavoured tobacco appeals to youth

Tobacco companies also use flavoured cigarettes to appeal to young people. With product names such as Mandarin Mint, Midnight Berry, Kauai Kolada and Warm Winter Toffee, you would think the pushers were talking about candy. Without doubt, that is the purpose of this branding.

<sup>53</sup> Reynolds, Patrick, address given at the launch of the Tobacco Divestment Project, Boston, Massachusetts, May 10, 1990.

According to a report published in the journal *Health Affairs*, internal documents show that cigarette manufacturers were aware of the trends in flavoured products such as soft drinks and snack foods and intended to apply that information to the development of their own new products.<sup>54</sup>

A report in the *New York Times* says:

Sugar and honey can be found in some of the cigarettes that British American Tobacco sells in the South Pacific, for instance. Health officials contend that the ingredients are added to lure children who might otherwise shy away from the acrid taste of cigarettes. The company denies the accusation, saying that there is not enough of the additives to mollify the harshness of smoking. But internal documents from as long ago as the 1970's from its American subsidiary, Brown & Williamson, point out that "it is a well-known fact that teenagers like sweet products."

"Honey might be considered," the documents added.<sup>55</sup>



*'Warm Winter Toffee' flavoured cigarettes*

In Canada, we see flavoured tobacco mostly in smokeless products and cigarillos, a small cigar-like product.



*'Midnight Berry' flavoured cigarettes*



*'Cherry Blend' smokeless tobacco*

<sup>54</sup> Carpenter CM, et al. New Cigarette Brands With Flavors That Appeal To Youth: Tobacco Marketing Strategies. *Health Affairs*. 2005; 24: 1601-1610.

<sup>55</sup> Winter G. "Big Tobacco is accused of crossing an age line," *New York Times*, August 24, 2001.



# Pushing addiction through sports

The tobacco industry spends tens of millions of dollars a year sponsoring sports around the world, particularly motor sports. They reach hundreds of millions through television coverage. In tobacco trade journals, the industry is remarkably frank about the marketing rationale behind sports sponsorship. RJR executive Wayne Robertson says:

We're in the cigarette business. We're not in the sports business. We use sports as an avenue for advertising our products.... We can go into an area where we're marketing an event, measure sales during the event and measure sales after the event, and see an increase in sales.<sup>56</sup>

Other reasons for sports sponsorship

include trying to get round advertising restrictions by the back door, wanting to associate their cigarettes with healthy, active pursuits, and trying to buy a bit of respectability for companies rocked by accusations of smuggling and racketeering.<sup>57</sup>

Sports sponsorship has become increasingly important to the tobacco industry as other promotional strategies have been banned by governments. In particular, sponsorship has substantially increased since tobacco advertising on television has been banned in most countries.<sup>58</sup>

Sponsorship advertising related to soccer, or football, as it's more commonly referred to worldwide, appears to be a priority for transnational tobacco companies. Associating tobacco with the world's most popular sport is not unknown in Ontario. In the

small town of Delhi, Ontario, the Benson & Hedges soccer field is used by kids as young as 10 years old.

Formula 1 racing has also been a major sales tool for Big Tobacco. Barrie Gill, chief executive of Championship Sports Specialists Ltd., a sports sponsorship company, explains why:



*Canadian Players sponsorship ad, 2002*

<sup>56</sup> **Robertson W.** As quoted in: "Warning: sports stars may be hazardous to your health – cigarette endorsement," *The Washington Monthly*, by Jason DeParle, September, 1989, pp. 34-49. [www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1316/is\\_n8\\_v21/ai\\_7939755](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_n8_v21/ai_7939755)

<sup>57</sup> **ASH UK.** Tobacco Sponsorship of Sport. March 2002. <http://www.ash.org.uk/html/advspo/html/sportssponsor.html>

<sup>58</sup> **ASH UK.** Sports and cultural sponsorship. June 26, 2001. [www.ash.org.uk/html/advspo/html/sports\\_sub.html](http://www.ash.org.uk/html/advspo/html/sports_sub.html)

It's the ideal sport for sponsorship. It's got glamour and worldwide television coverage. It's a ten-month activity involving sixteen races in fourteen countries with drivers from sixteen nationalities. After football it's the Number One multinational sport. It's got total global exposure, total global hospitality, total media coverage and 600 million people watching it on TV every fortnight. ... It's macho, it's excitement, it's colour, it's international, it's glamour. ... They're there to get visibility. They're there to sell cigarettes.<sup>59</sup>



*Sponsorship ads have nothing to do with selling cigarettes. Big Tobacco tells another whopper.*

With the passage of the TPCA in 1988, it was the will of Parliament that both tobacco brand advertising and sponsorship advertising would be banned. However, the industry exploited a loophole in the

TPCA that allowed sponsorship ads to continue. Unfortunately, it took 15 years, from 1988 to 2003, before Canadians saw the last of tobacco sponsorship ads in Canada. Sadly, young Canadians lured into tobacco addiction during that unnecessary and unintended 15-year interval, will now serve as models of smoking behaviour well into the future. Sponsorship advertising during this period assisted in the addiction of a generation of kids. And the federal government sat on its hands as the loophole was exploited.

From the 1990s to 2003 in Canada, tobacco sponsorship ads targeting risk-taking youth featured extreme activities like auto racing, hang gliding, mountain climbing, dirt biking and wakeboarding.

Until very recently, Canada's JTI-Macdonald ran the Extreme Music & Sports Series website and events. Motocross, wakeboarding events and rock n' roll concerts were all part of that marketing campaign. Big Tobacco knows that extreme activities appeal to young people.



<sup>59</sup> Gill B. As quoted in: *Smoke Ring: The Politics of Tobacco*, by Taylor P, 1984, Bodley Head, pp. 101-103.




## Big Tobacco: "Sports ads do not target youth"



For further reading, see:

- Big Tobacco & Sports: Foul Play Around the World <http://www.essentialaction.org/tobacco/qofm/0203a.html>
- Tobacco Sponsorship of Sport <http://www.ash.org.uk/html/advspo/html/sportssponsor.html>

# Using religion to peddle addiction



*A Fortune Tobacco wall calendar in the Philippines*

One of the most cynical examples of the tobacco industry putting profits before ethical marketing is its use of religious symbols to sell addiction. Just one example is this 1994 Philippines calendar featuring a photo of the Virgin Mary praying above a display of 10 packages of cigarettes including Camel and Winston brands. The Philippines has a large and devout Catholic population. When tobacco companies associate their products with this religion, it suggests to the public that smoking is endorsed by the church. In 1980, Philip Morris sponsored a highly successful tour of Vatican art.<sup>60</sup> Tobacco company executives have also been celebrated at banquets sponsored by church bodies in gratitude for their generosity to religious charities.<sup>61</sup>

## Big Tobacco causes environmental devastation


The production of tobacco leaves has doubled since the 1960s, totalling nearly 6 million metric tonnes in 2004/2005.<sup>62</sup> The greater use of fertilizers and pesticides, as well as the increased mechanization that have produced higher yields, are environmentally damaging. The problem does not end with growing tobacco. The processes used in curing tobacco leaves cause massive deforestation.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Vidulich D. "Fuming over tobacco promo: priest says 'Blessed Virgin hawking cigarettes goes too far'," National Catholic Reporter; 9 December 1994. [www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1141/is\\_n7\\_v31/ai\\_15989949](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1141/is_n7_v31/ai_15989949)

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. Production, Supply & Distribution Online Database, Dry Weight Production figures for 2004/2005. [www.fas.usda.gov/psd/psdselection.asp](http://www.fas.usda.gov/psd/psdselection.asp)

<sup>63</sup> Mackay J, Erikson M. The Tobacco Atlas, World Health Organization, 2002, p. 46.



### Deforestation

Proportion of total annual deforestation attributable to tobacco  
1999 selected countries

*From The Tobacco Atlas 66*

In turn, the loss of forests causes other environmental problems including soil erosion, flooding, loss of habitat for animals and plants and global warming. The growing of tobacco adds to the problem of deforestation because forests are cleared for growing. But it is the cutting of trees for fuel to dry tobacco that is the major cause of deforestation. In order to prepare tobacco for cigarettes and other products, it has to be dried or cured by burning wood.<sup>64</sup> Worldwide, the felling of trees for tobacco curing accounts for 1.7% of forest loss. But in 66 tobacco-growing countries, almost all of which are developing countries, 4.6% of national deforestation is due to the cutting of trees to cure tobacco.<sup>65</sup>

Recent research indicates that an environmentally critical situation is emerging in more than 30 countries with South Korea, Uruguay, Bangladesh,

Malawi, Jordan, Pakistan, Syria, China and Zimbabwe leading the list of countries with the highest percentage of tobacco-related deforestation.<sup>67</sup>

Cigarettes that have not been extinguished properly pose a serious fire hazard and also contribute to deforestation. It is estimated that one-quarter to one-third of forest fires around the world are caused by smokers. If that estimate is accurate, then the amount of wood in forests that is burned by smokers could surpass the sums used by the entire tobacco industry. Apart from the human and property costs, such fires have huge impacts on forests, biodiversity, and watersheds. When all these different impacts are totalled, it is clear that the tobacco industry is a major contributor to deforestation. This has serious ecological consequences including the loss of ecosystem functions and biodiversity as well as soil erosion and degradation.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Science, Tobacco & You, Center for Integrating Research and Learning  
<http://scienceu.fsu.edu/content/tobaccoyou/environent/docs/deforestation.html>

<sup>65</sup> Geist H. Global assessment of deforestation related to tobacco farming. *Tobacco Control*; 1999;8: 18-28.

<sup>66</sup> Mackay J, Erikson M. *The Tobacco Atlas*, World Health Organization, 2002, p. 46.

<sup>67</sup> Campaign for Tobacco-free Kids. *Golden Leaf, Barren Harvest*. November, 2001, p. 26. [www.tobaccofreekids.org/campaign/global/FCTCreport1.pdf](http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/campaign/global/FCTCreport1.pdf)

<sup>68</sup> World Wildlife Fund. *Agriculture and Environment: Tobacco. Environmental Impacts of Production: Deforestation*. [www.panda.org/about\\_wwf/what\\_we\\_do/policy/agriculture\\_environment/commodities/tobacco/environmental\\_impacts/deforestation/index.cfm](http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/policy/agriculture_environment/commodities/tobacco/environmental_impacts/deforestation/index.cfm)



# Tobacco product placement in movies

The relationship between Hollywood stars and the tobacco industry goes back decades. Movie stars John Wayne and Ronald Reagan shilled for Big Tobacco but they did so up front in tobacco advertisements. TV star Lucille Ball of "I love Lucy" fame was just one of many others who got into bed with tobacco manufacturers.

In today's climate, no movie star of any stature would damage their careers by appearing in tobacco advertisements. So product placement in movies with implied star endorsements of tobacco addiction and of specific products has replaced star endorsements in brand advertising.



*Sylvester Stallone was paid to smoke in films*

There have been few marketing strategies employed by Big Tobacco more effective than paying to have their products shown in movies. Movie stars lighting up creates the impression in young minds that smoking is normal, rebellious and cool. Cigarette placement in movies creates a desired

association between the sex appeal and charisma of the star smoking and the cigarette being smoked. The value of this marketing cannot be overstated.

Almost without exception, the illness and death that cigarettes cause never accompany tobacco use in films.

Secretly, tobacco companies began paying key figures in the movie industry to show specific brands on screen and the practice then became widespread. So much so that when California teenagers reviewed the 500 top box office movies in the U.S. between 1991 and 2001 they found that three quarters of the films included tobacco use. In 79% of the movies with smoking, it was one or more of the leading actors who were smoking.<sup>69</sup>

In one infamous pay-off in 1983, Sylvester Stallone, the star of the Rocky and Rambo movie franchises, agreed to smoke Brown and Williamson tobacco products in five feature films that he would produce. He was paid US \$500,000 to do so.<sup>70</sup> At the time, Brown and Williamson was owned by BAT, the parent of Canada's Imperial Tobacco.

According to court documents obtained in litigation in the United States, in the James Bond movie *Never Say Never Again*, the film's producers "agreed that Sean Connery, and other principal players, will smoke Winston and Camel cigarettes" for a financial consideration of US\$10,000.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>69</sup> American Lung Association of Sacramento-Emigrant Trials. Thumbs Up! Thumbs Down! Movie Summary: 1991-2001 Date Summary and Comparison, 2002.

<sup>70</sup> Stallone S. [Letter to B. Kovoloff guaranteeing use of B&W tobacco products in five feature films]. April 28, 1983. Bates No. 685083119. <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=cuf33f00&fmt=pdf&ref=results>

<sup>71</sup> Devaney F. Activity report - R.J. Reynolds. Rogers & Cowan, Inc. September 3, 1982. Bates No. 503579592-9594. [www.rjrtdocs.com](http://www.rjrtdocs.com)



## Using movie and TV stars to flog cigarettes in the 1940s and 1950s....



*Ronald Reagan*



*Lucille Ball*



*John Wayne*

It apparently cost the American Tobacco Company (ATC) US\$40,000 annually to place their products in movies. In the opening scene of *Beverly Hills Cop*, perhaps one of the most grotesque examples of tobacco product placement in film, ATC successfully placed Lucky Strike and Pall Mall cigarette packages into a scene, and had Eddie Murphy say: "These are very popular cigarettes with the children."<sup>72</sup>

The tobacco and movie industries received severe criticism for this advertising. So in 1989 the tobacco companies "volunteered" to stop it. As with virtually all voluntary efforts to restrain the excesses of Big Tobacco, this did not work. Today, smoking is more widespread in movies than it was then. Modern-day film stars such as Julia Roberts, Brad Pitt, Gwyneth Paltrow, Jim Carey, Jude Law, Angelina Jolie and Renee Zellweger have been criticized for glamourizing smoking in films and some for promoting particular brands.

In *Titanic*, one of the most popular movies in the history of filmmaking, Leonardo DiCaprio and co-star Kate Winslet both light up, equating cigarettes with romance and rebellion for as many as 100 million viewers worldwide. This kind of celebrity endorsement is priceless for tobacco companies and the tobacco use modelling involved will live on for years with repeated showings on home video and television.



*Sharon Stone in Basic Instinct*

<sup>72</sup> McFinn JA. Unique Product Placement early contract renewal. American Tobacco Company; May 27, 1986. Bates No. 970313406. <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=big35f00&fmt=pdf&ref=results>

Product placement is not confined to the movie screen. The General Cigar Company paid US \$27,000 to place its products on the TV sitcoms Friends, Baywatch, Mad about You, Spin City, Suddenly Susan and Third Rock from the Sun.

Perhaps what is most disturbing about product placement advertising is that viewers aren't always aware that it's even happening. During television commercial breaks viewers know that they are watching advertising. But having the products woven into films and television shows is more subtle. Tobacco product placement easily deceives the young into thinking that not only is smoking normal but the most attractive actors are smoking.

There is a growing international movement opposed to tobacco product placement. Stanton Glantz is leading the fight. Glantz, a University of California at San Francisco professor of medicine and co-author of *The Cigarette Papers* and *Tobacco War*, and arguably the most influential tobacco control activist in the world, has taken on the product placement issue with a passion. For information on his hard-ball Smoke Free Movies Campaign, visit <http://smokefreemovies.ucsf.edu>. Also, check out Smoking in Movies at <http://smokefreemovies.ucsf.edu>. It has reviews of smoking in current movies.



*Brad Pitt in Fight Club*

## Brand-stretching and trademark diversification

As countries clamp down on tobacco marketing, the industry has begun to move away from traditional forms of advertising. They are stretching their brands by creating clothing lines which carry the names and logos of popular brands of cigarettes.



*When Central and Eastern European countries first switched to Western-style market economies, Big Tobacco moved in fast. One early stroke of predatory marketing was seen in Bucharest, Romania. There, all the amber lenses of the city centre traffic lights became Camel ads.*

Retailers in Africa frequently sell Marlboro brand t-shirts and sweaters. Thailand has a Camel store and Marlboro Classics, which has shops in Europe, sells cowboy boots and trousers. This trademark diversification maintains brand exposure and enhances brand image. And it sells cigarettes.



*Camel store in Thailand*

# Front groups and allies

**T**he tobacco industry uses front groups as a strategy to weaken or defeat tobacco control measures. The industry has understood for many years that it has little credibility with the public, media and legislators. To overcome the credibility obstacle, the industry has had to rely on allies, fronts and junk science to confuse legislators and the public and to undermine legislative and regulatory reforms. For example, during debates about Canada's graphic health warnings on cigarette packs, the tobacco industry leaned on its printing/packaging suppliers to pressure the federal government not to adopt the regulation. On cue, these suppliers, fearful of losing their Big Tobacco business, claimed they could not print the new coloured warnings with existing equipment and that there would be significant job losses if the new warnings became law.

In the absence of allies or when the help of allies is just not enough, the tobacco industry or interests acting on its behalf often go a step further and set up phoney organizations or fronts. These profess to defend the interests of stakeholders unrelated to tobacco companies. The links between the tobacco industry and these groups are not always apparent and the public and the media can easily be deceived into believing that these organizations are credible.

**mychoice.ca**

**T**he Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council (CTMC) paid \$2.5 million to launch mychoice.ca and its French equivalent, monchoix.ca, in April 2005 to mobilize opposition to provincial second-hand smoke legislation. And the CTMC, perhaps to head off future legal problems, was quick to admit it

In the past, tobacco companies refrained from revealing information regarding their financial support for fronts. But when those financial ties were exposed following investigations by journalists or tobacco control groups, both the companies and their fronts were dealt significant public relations blows. To eliminate such criticism, the manufacturers volunteered information about their financial support for mychoice.ca and monchoix.ca.

The purpose of these fronts is

- to make legislators and the media believe smokers are organizing against reforms;

**It's "my choice" to be ethically challenged**

**mychoice.ca**  
**Nancy Dagmeant,**  
**President**



**monchoix.ca**  
**Arminde Mota,**  
**Vice-President**



**mychoice.ca and monchoix.ca: the latest in a long list of Canadian tobacco industry fronts**



- to put disinformation into the system without the manufacturers having to accept legal responsibility for the deception;
- to create the impression that there is conflict between smokers and non-smokers and to make smokers feel that they are being treated unfairly. This encourages smokers to oppose reforms more aggressively. In fact, the real conflict is between the tobacco industry and everyone else;
- to put a pro-industry position on the record in news stories when the manufacturers do not wish to appear on camera or in print. When they say a spokesperson for their companies is not available, the manufacturers often direct journalists to a front. (Notice also that both mychoice.ca and its French equivalent have female spokespersons. This is also true of the manufacturers. The Smoke Folk know that the public believes that women are generally more truthful and more compassionate, hence less likely to engage in the nasty activities historically practiced by the men in Big Tobacco.)

Without blushing, the industry insists that mychoice.ca is independent although the industry or its agents (often a PR firm) created the front's management and selected its head and when the industry or its agents were the sole or major source of funding. Of course, audited financial statements are not available to the front's so-called members and/or supporters and there is no way of verifying membership or very little else connected to the front.

**English website: [www.mychoice.ca](http://www.mychoice.ca)**

**French website: [www.monchoix.ca](http://www.monchoix.ca)**

## The Fair Air Association of Canada (FAAC)

The Fair Air Association of Canada (FAAC) wants everyone to believe it is an "Association of Associations" and claims to represent a variety of stakeholders on second-hand smoke issues. This organization includes members of the hospitality industry, including pub and bar owners, bingo operators, ventilation equipment manufacturers and tobacco companies. Its first president, Karen Bodirsky, admitted in a conversation with a Toronto city councillor in March 2004, that a "substantial portion" of the FAAC's funding is received from the tobacco industry. Any amount of support up to a dollar short of total funding is a "substantial portion." If Bodirsky wasn't directly on a cigarette manufacturer's payroll in 2004 and 2005, she is now. As we go to print in 2007, Bodirsky is now Director, Public Affairs, at Rothmans, Benson & Hedges.

The FAAC dismisses second-hand smoke as a serious threat to health, a position with which the manufacturers are reluctant to be associated for liability reasons. Medical evidence is depicted as flawed and exaggerated. Ventilation is championed as a viable alternative to smoking bans. The FAAC employs an aggressive economic argument predicting doom and gloom for the hospitality industry if smoke bans are not stopped or reversed.

Recently, the FAAC provided part of the funding for a study authored by economist Dr. Michael Evans, a long-time friend of the tobacco industry. As per the pattern, the study claims to prove that smoking bans result in economic disaster.

**Website: [www.faac.ca](http://www.faac.ca)**



# PUBCO

## Organizations that behave like tobacco industry fronts

**P**UBCO appears to have been launched in 2001 by Ottawa pub and bar owners to oppose a municipal by-law which introduced the most complete smoking ban in Canada. It could have been organized by agents of tobacco manufacturers who had an interest in blocking or overturning the by-law. We may never know which. What we do know is that organizations representing hospitality interests are not wealthy and generally do not have the funds to engage in protracted and expensive lawsuits without the assistance of folks with deep pockets.



One critic claims that PUBCO represented less than 10% of bars and restaurants in Ottawa, yet was quite active in the campaign to oppose the by-law.<sup>73</sup> Funding by the tobacco industry was further suggested following the publication of a PUBCO newspaper ad which included a phone number for PUBCO which, when called after hours, was answered by the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council.

PUBCO expanded its activities to other municipalities to oppose similar by-laws. It also joined with the Fair Air Association of Canada to co-fund a study designed to prove that smoking bans have negative economic consequences. PUBCO's website is laden with familiar tobacco industry rhetoric.

**Website:** [www.pubcoalition.com](http://www.pubcoalition.com)

**N**ational organizations like the Canadian Restaurant and Foodservices Association, the Canadian Hotel Association and similar provincial associations (e.g. Ontario Restaurant, Hotel and Motel Association, Ontario Convenience Stores Association, Ontario Korean Businessmen's Association) have all worked closely with the tobacco industry or with interests it funds from time-to-time. However, even though these associations may have fronted for or acted as apologists for the Smoke Folk or partnered with the industry to undermine or block reform, they are not fronts like mychoice.ca.

Restaurateurs have worked hard for over 30 years to block legislation designed to address second-hand smoke issues. And convenience store associations have fought hard to preserve the income of members from cigarette-generated customer traffic and 'power walls'. Before the law reform focus shifted to banning displays of tobacco and the emphasis was on stopping illegal sales of tobacco to kids, the retailers allied themselves completely with industry campaigns designed to convince legislators, the media and the public that the pushers are sincere in their desire to keep kids away from the cigarettes. Operation I.D. is such a campaign.

<sup>73</sup> Collishaw N, Physicians for a Smoke-free Canada. "The smoking ban is good for business and for public health," The Ottawa Citizen, 6 December 2001, p. B6.



## Operation I.D. and other industry diversion/disinformation strategies

The Operation I.D. campaign is one of the more cynical and self-serving initiatives that the pushers have produced. The manufacturers know very well that as they focus the public's attention on the prohibition of sales to minors, they plant firmly in the minds of kids that smoking is an adult activity. In this way, the pushers establish smoking as a badge or symbol of entry into adulthood. Philip Morris pressed for "education in regard to smoking being an adult practice."<sup>74</sup>

One of the dumbest campaigns ever devised was an Operation I.D. clone. It was introduced by the Ontario Ministry of Health and was used throughout the 1990s. Across Ontario, signs in every convenience store encouraged kids to try to circumvent the law. "Under 19?" the signs challenged kids. "Forget it." The Ministry should have had signs more honest. "Hurry up and become 19," they should have read. "Then you will be an adult and you can smoke." In the absence of such honesty or, apparently, a ministerial brain, what rebellious kid would not be encouraged to evade the law with a sign that presents an implicit challenge to rebel?

The phoney Operation I.D. youth smoking prevention programme professes to help retailers stop cigarette sales to minors. Naturally, because any industry connection would raise suspicion about its purpose, Operation I.D. is run by a front, the Canadian Coalition for Responsible Tobacco Retailing. It should be called the Coalition for the Responsible Retailing of Drug Addiction.

The Operation I.D. PR programme was originally conceived in the United States by the now

defunct Tobacco Institute (TI) and had the theme, "IT'S THE LAW". The campaign name has now been changed to "We Card" and is promoted by the U.S. Coalition for Responsible Tobacco Retailing. Judge Kessler, in her 2006 RICO judgment, ruled that the campaign originator, TI, and TI member companies engaged in fraud and racketeering. But, earlier, the TI had been shut down in the *Master Settlement Agreement* by the U.S. state attorneys general.

Two Philip Morris memos from 1991 and 1995 clearly indicate the true purposes of this programme. The first memo says goals include:

1. a reduction in legislation introduced and passed restricting or banning our sales and marketing activities;
2. passage of legislation favourable to the industry;
3. greater support from business, parent and teacher groups.<sup>75</sup>

The second memo offers even more direct evidence:

...we believe that the first building block to a successful, fully integrated program is an 'It's the Law' Program. This is fundamental to our long term strategy for stopping the proliferation of anti-tobacco legislation.<sup>76</sup>

Unfortunately, over 250 businesses, organizations and politicians have endorsed Operation I.D., the Canadian clone of IT'S THE LAW.

<sup>74</sup> Slavitt JJ. "TI Youth Initiative." Philip Morris memo. 12 February 1991. [www.pmdocs.com/PDF/2500082629\\_0.PDF](http://www.pmdocs.com/PDF/2500082629_0.PDF)

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> Leiber CL. "Youth Initiatives." 18 May 1995. Philip Morris International Inc. memo. [www.pmdocs.com/PDF/2503019011\\_0.PDF](http://www.pmdocs.com/PDF/2503019011_0.PDF)



## John Luik

Individual Canadians have also played a major role in confusing the public, media and legislators about tobacco risks. The discredited academic, John Luik, is but one of many. Luik, of Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, is, as the expression goes, a 'piece of work'. From where we sit, he appears to be one of the most active of all of the industry's disinformation artists, travelling the world on behalf of tobacco transnationals, meeting with governments, appearing before legislatures, completing interviews.

But on June 21, 2001, his relationship with the tobacco industry was revealed, his cover blown and his credibility shattered when CBC TV's "The Fifth Estate" and Montreal's *The Gazette* combined to expose the real John Luik. Here is what the award-winning, investigative journalist William Marsden said about Luik in a front-page story in *The Gazette*, entitled "Big Tobacco's shell game with the truth":

The industry has for years waged what it has secretly described as a "multiple warhead" campaign to undermine public confidence in scientific studies linking second-hand smoke to lung cancer and heart disease, industry documents show. Big tobacco's point man is a Canadian-based philosophy and ethics teacher who was tossed out of a Canadian university and a Manitoba college for lying about his employment record and academic qualifications, the documents show.

His name is John Luik and for the last 10 years, he has been a high-profile frontline warrior in the tobacco industry's effort to disparage scientific studies linking second-hand smoke to cancer as 'junk' and 'fraudulent.' ...

For a decade, he has traveled the globe attempting to discredit scientific studies on second-hand smoke, smoking bans and restrictions on tobacco advertising, often without revealing his ties to the tobacco industry. Documents indicate that tobacco companies have paid him tens of thousands of dollars for his work. Tobacco companies are using Luik to influence public opinion much in the same way that they orchestrated grass-roots protests against high cigarette taxes in the early 1990s.

The memo laid out a "plan of action" that involved hiring "third parties" to lead a worldwide campaign to plant "genuine doubts, conflicts, ambiguities and contradictions that characterize the evidence against smoking". One of those "third parties" – also referred to as a "rain-maker" – was John Luik. From 1987 on, he has worked tirelessly for the industry worldwide. He was commissioned in 1994 to edit a book entitled *Plain Packaging and the Marketing of Cigarettes*. His fee? \$155,000, according to a tobacco industry document. He was also commissioned in 1993 to write a critical analysis of a pivotal 1992 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) study, which concluded that second-hand smoke causes about 3,000 cancer deaths annually in the U.S. ...

In a companion article on the same day entitled "Luik lied to universities about his qualifications," Marsden wrote that Luik:

taught philosophy at the Canadian Nazarene College in Winnipeg from 1977 to 1985 when he was dismissed from the college for lying on his resume... .

He got "another chance" when Brock University hired him to teach "applied and professional ethics"!

But, in 1990, Brock discovered Luik's one mistake had turned into a flood as he continued to misrepresent his academic qualifications ... Prof. Luik showed "no particular signs of contrition or even embarrassment on being confronted with this misrepresentation... This suggested that what was involved was indeed faulty moral judgment". Cecil Abrahams, former Dean of Humanities at Brock and now chancellor of South Africa's University of West Cape, recently told the CBC's Fifth Estate that Luik was the "worst case of fraud that I had come across and I've been an administrator at universities for a long period of time".

In a related article in St. Catherines, Ontario's *The Standard* the next day, Marsden wrote:

But, in 1990, Luik was fined \$60,000 for failing to file income tax and GST returns. The fine was levied against Luik after he pleaded guilty to one count of failing to file his 1992 income tax return and four counts of failing to file GST returns.

## The Fraser Institute

**W**e cannot talk about tobacco control in Canada without reserving a special spot for The Fraser Institute. Its determined support for the rogue tobacco industry in the face of clear ethical choices puts to the lie any suggestion that The Fraser Institute is an independent, honest, policy research organization.

In April 1999, the Non-Smokers' Rights Association exposed The Fraser Institute's role as an apologist for and friend of Big Tobacco in the report *The Fraser Institute: Economic Think Tank or Front for the Tobacco Industry?* The report's sub-title almost says it all: "What Canadians should know about the Fraser Institute's junk conferences on risk assessment and tobacco control". In this report, the NSRA revealed The Fraser Institute's funding by Philip Morris and Rothmans International. It also discusses the relationship with the tobacco industry of

Fraser Institute "junk science" conference speakers, like John Luik and Jacob Sullum.



*Michael Walker in bed with Big Tobacco*

Two years later, after Luik's cover was blown and while the Fraser Institute was still promoting Luik's book, *Passive Smoke: The EPA's Betrayal of Science of Policy*, the institute's head, Michael Walker, pretended to be surprised when confronted by "The Fifth Estate" and by William Marsden:

The [Luik/Gori] book argued that the judgment proved the EPA had indulged in 'junk science' to support a 'conspiracy of public disinformation.' (The book ignored three other major studies that confirmed the EPA's findings.)... .

Institute director Michael Walker said in an interview that the books [*Passive Smoke* and *Safe Enough: Managing Risk and Regulation*] were published with money from Philip Morris and other tobacco companies. This was not mentioned in the Fraser publications... .

From 1996 to 1998, companies with tobacco holdings had contributed one to 1.3 percent (\$31,740 to \$76,180) of the institute's total annual budget. But when Luik's book was published, that figure climbed to 5 per cent or \$229,300. Walker said the money was also used to fund two conferences: one on tobacco and second-hand smoke and the other on assessing risk in a variety of consumer goods, including tobacco. Luik was a prominent speaker at both conferences.

In other words, Big Tobacco bought The Fraser Institute. We note for the record that The Fraser Institute received \$100,000 from the Imperial Tobacco Limited Foundation in 2005. The NSRA report can be found at <http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/page1236.cfm>.



## Buying scientists

**W**ebster's Third New International Dictionary says science is the objective pursuit of "truth and knowledge as distinguished from ignorance or misunderstanding." The tobacco industry is the antithesis of this principle. The smoke industry has a decades-long history of being anti-science and anti-truth. This record, combined with its encouragement of confusion through fraud, negligence and conspiracy, has led to millions of deaths. Such behaviour would normally persuade ethical scientists not to want to touch such an industry with a ten-foot-pole.

Of course, we said ethical scientists. There are, however, others. The Sterlings of British Columbia, the senior Sterling, Ted, the late professor of computer science at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, and his son, Elia, are two whose ethics are questionable.

Besides teaching, Sterling also ran Theodor D. Sterling and Associates which claims to be "a multi-



*Theodor (Ted) Sterling*



*Elia Sterling*

disciplinary consulting firm providing indoor air quality, environmental and a variety of occupational hygiene and safety consulting services to clients in Canada, the United States and South America."

One of those clients was the now defunct U.S. Council for Tobacco Research (CTR). CTR's special projects programme was established by tobacco companies "to discredit scientific findings about the health dangers of smoking" and of second-hand smoke. Between 1973 and 1990, Big Tobacco paid over \$5 million to Ted Sterling's consulting firm.

In 1993, once the tobacco industry realized that it was losing the battle to de-link second-hand smoke from disease, it reoriented Theodor Sterling's work to present ventilation as an effective way to get rid of second-hand smoke.

The U.S. tobacco industry's objective with its funding through the Council for Tobacco Research was to create controversy, confuse the public, deny the risks of second-hand smoke and slow or block law reform designed to protect non-smokers from second-hand smoke. According to the Judge Gladys Kessler's U.S. Federal Court decision in 2006 that found that U.S. cigarette makers had engaged in a massive fraud, Sterling's financial ties with the industry lasted from the early 1970s to the 1990s. And, according to industry documents, Ted Sterling was one of Big Tobacco's "most valuable outside assets." <sup>80</sup>

Was his work competent, honest and in "search of truth" as Simon Fraser University claimed when it gave Ted Sterling an honorary degree in 2001? Did he "undertake [credible] research work examining the major health factors in the area of smoking and health" as SFU president Michael Stevenson claimed in his defence of the degree being given to Sterling? Well, Ted Sterling, and to a lesser extent his son Elia, are cited frequently in the decision by Judge Kessler that concludes that the U.S. tobacco

<sup>80</sup> Crohn MH, Jr. R.J. Reynolds. Letter to E. A. Horrigan, Jr. Bates No. 503645463. <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=byr85d00&fmt=pdf&ref=results>

companies were guilty of racketeering and that the work by CTR on second-hand smoke contributed to fraud.

Then there was Ted Sterling's straight-faced claim in an article submitted in 1977 to the *Medical Journal of Australia* that it had not yet been proven that cigarettes cause disease in smokers, never mind in non-smokers! This occurred at least 13 years after a causal relationship between cigarettes and disease had been established by the U.K. Royal College of Physicians and the U.S. Surgeon General.

The Australian medical journal was so surprised at the audacity of Sterling's position that it took an unprecedented step. It decided to publish his research as well as a scathing editorial denouncing his claims in the same issue. Needless to say, Sterling took steps to hide information about his tobacco industry funding from the public.

Was Sterling correct in his assertion that second-hand smoke does not cause disease? Was he correct that ventilation is an effective way to reduce the risks of second-hand smoke for non-smokers? In 2006, the U.S. Surgeon General said that the debate is over and that, implicitly, Sterling's denials were up there with flat earth theory. This was the Ted Sterling "search for truth" and "community service" which Simon Fraser University and


Michael Stevenson both applauded.

According to J. Drope et al, Elia Sterling has played "an important role for the tobacco industry in trying to influence" American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air Conditioning Engineer's (ASHRAE) standards on second-hand smoke, acceptable indoor air quality and ventilation. ASHRAE standards are used around the world. Elia, it appears, is following in his discredited father's footsteps.

These individuals are but two of hundreds of 'experts' who have been hired by Big Tobacco over the years to help refute the evidence and confuse the public about tobacco-related issues.

For more info about the tobacco industry buying scientists, see: Project Whitecoat - how Philip Morris bought up scientists and waged war on the truth.

Go to [www.ash.org.uk/html/conduct/html/pmorris1.html](http://www.ash.org.uk/html/conduct/html/pmorris1.html), 1988. Project Whitecoat was one of the most disgraceful PR campaigns ever revealed. Find out how Philip Morris and its lawyers invented controversy around second-hand smoke. A selection of confidential documents from the makers of Marlboro shows how they bought scientists ("whitecoats"), set up learned societies and infiltrated respected institutions.



*The tobacco industry claims it does not target kids. Who do you think this pink DJ Mix package targets? Or the Joe Camel Lights?*

# Exporting the epidemic

In the 20th century, 100 million people were killed by tobacco-caused diseases. Based on current smoking patterns, the World Health Organization and other authorities predict that one billion people will die prematurely at the hands of tobacco industry products in this century. One billion! <sup>81</sup>

In some developed countries like Canada, legislation, education and taxation have combined to cut tobacco use. Although some are starting to implement the tobacco control measures that have proven effective in industrialized countries, tobacco industry products will still exact their most devastating toll in the developing world. Projections indicate that by 2020, approximately seven million of the nine million annual deaths caused by tobacco will occur in developing countries. <sup>82</sup>

This will occur because tobacco use has not yet peaked there. Tragically, legislation is weak or non-existent in most of these countries, money for tobacco control is woefully inadequate and the political will to confront the industry has not developed.

Therefore, as markets in the developed world shrink, Big Tobacco is pouring money into Third World countries to develop new markets.

For more on Big Tobacco's global expansion, see:



- Pushing & Peddling  
[www.newint.org/issue369/pushing.htm](http://www.newint.org/issue369/pushing.htm)
- What Big Tobacco is up to around the world  
[www.essentialaction.org/tobaccoqofm/0201a.html](http://www.essentialaction.org/tobaccoqofm/0201a.html)
- How do you sell death  
[www.tobaccofreekids.org/campaign/global/FCTCreport2.pdf](http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/campaign/global/FCTCreport2.pdf)
- Addicted to Profit: Big Tobacco's Expanding Global Reach  
[www.essentialaction.org/addicted](http://www.essentialaction.org/addicted)

<sup>81</sup> Esson KM, Leeder SR. The millennium development goals and tobacco control: an opportunity for global partnership. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005.

<sup>82</sup> Harvard Gazette. "Tobacco deaths a developing problem," 18 September 2003.  
[www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/09.18/26-tobacco.html](http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/09.18/26-tobacco.html)

## Conflict between food and tobacco

**M**any of the world's poor are being devastated by Big Tobacco. They are spending money on feeding their addiction to nicotine that they desperately need for necessities such as food and shelter. Worse, poor people tend to smoke the most. Of the estimated 1.3 billion smokers worldwide, 84% live in developing nations. Studies from Bangladesh show that the poorest households there spent 10 times more on tobacco than they do on education.

Children suffer immensely because of this. If money spent on tobacco were spent instead on food in Bangladesh, 10.5 million currently malnourished people would have an adequate diet. Researchers estimate that 350 children are dying each day in Bangladesh alone due to the diversion of money from food to tobacco.<sup>83</sup>



For more information on tobacco and poverty, see: [www.who.int/tobacco/resources/publications/wntd/2004/en/index.html](http://www.who.int/tobacco/resources/publications/wntd/2004/en/index.html)

## Tobacco Smuggling

**S**muggling is a tactic used by tobacco companies worldwide to get their products into the hands of consumers as cheaply as possible. Price, the higher the better, helps prevent youth from starting to smoke and encourages many current smokers to quit, hurting tobacco industry profits. On the other hand, when prices are low, consumption goes up. That's why tobacco companies oppose tax increases, saying it will lead to smuggling and illegal sales. What they don't say is that they have a history of being involved in the smuggling. They do it not only to flood the streets with their cheap products, but also to promote some of the world's most popular brands in markets which remain closed to foreign imports.



Front page of *The Gazette* (Montreal), November 27, 2004

<sup>83</sup> Efroymson D, et al. Hungry for Tobacco: an analysis of the impact of tobacco on the poor in Bangladesh. *Tobacco Control* 2001;10:212-217.



# Criminal Responsibility: Tobacco execs face the slammer

In Canada, the RCMP continues to investigate Canada's three largest tobacco companies for their involvement in smuggling in the 1990s. One former senior sales manager with RJR-Macdonald (which has since been bought by Japan Tobacco International and is now called JTI-Macdonald) pleaded guilty in 1999 to a wire fraud scheme to defraud the U.S.A. of tax revenue. It is alleged that employees of RJR-Macdonald were involved in selling truckloads of cigarettes directly to an organized smuggling ring in New York State, and that these cigarettes were then smuggled back into Canada, to avoid paying taxes here. In February 2003, the RCMP laid six counts of fraud and one count of conspiracy against JTI-Macdonald.

Eight former and current employees were also charged. Investigators allege the companies and individuals involved conspired to defraud the governments of Canada, Ontario and Quebec out of \$1.2 billion in tobacco tax revenue between 1991 and 1996. The preliminary hearing on the criminal charges started in a Toronto courtroom in 2005. We expect to find out in 2007 which defendants will go to trial.

But it's not just JTI-Macdonald that's feeling the heat. In November 2004, the RCMP raided the head offices of Imperial Tobacco Canada in Montreal. The affidavit used by the RCMP to obtain their search warrant alleges collusion with the

smugglers went to the top of BAT, Imperial's parent company. It quotes confidential letters from 1993 exchanged between Ulrich Herter, the managing director at BAT and Don Brown, chairman, president and CEO of Imperial at the time. In the letters, Brown and Herter discuss amending a contract obliging Imperial to pay a royalty rate to its parent company for supplying BAT's du Maurier brand outside Canada. They agree that, as Imperial was supplying the cigarettes to the U.S. market in the knowledge that many of them would be smuggled back into Canada, it should pay only a two per cent rate, rather than the normal five per cent, to its parent company. Herter tells Brown:

Although we agreed to support the Federal government's effort to reduce smuggling by limiting our exports to the USA, our competitors did not. Subsequently we have decided to remove the limits on our exports to regain our share of Canadian smokers... Until the smuggling issue is resolved an increasing volume of our domestic sales in Canada will be exported then smuggled back for sale here.<sup>84</sup>

At one point, the role of Rothmans, Benson & Hedges in smuggling was also under investigation, and could be continuing. In January 2002, the RCMP searched RBH's business premises in connection with an investigation into the company's business records and sales of products exported from Canada in the period 1989-1996.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Herter U. British American Tobacco. Bates No. 5000281453. June 1993. [www.public-i.org/docs/Tobacco/BrownToHerter.pdf](http://www.public-i.org/docs/Tobacco/BrownToHerter.pdf)

<sup>85</sup> Rothmans Inc. Full Annual Report 2006, p. 68. [www.rothmansinc.ca/English/2005-06/AR/RINC%2006\\_ENG%20ANNUAL.pdf](http://www.rothmansinc.ca/English/2005-06/AR/RINC%2006_ENG%20ANNUAL.pdf)

## Tobacco companies face lawsuits worth billions

**A**t the same time that Canadian tobacco companies and executives face criminal charges and time in the slammer, they also face civil threats from massive smuggling-related lawsuits. On August 14, 2003, the federal government announced that it is suing JTI-Macdonald Corp. and 12 other tobacco companies for \$1.5 billion. The Government of Canada is seeking damages for "fraud, deceit, fraudulent misrepresentation, spoliation (i.e. destruction of documents) and civil conspiracy."

In 2004, in the face of a judgment obtained by the Quebec tax department, JTI sought bankruptcy protection in Ontario courts. Under a court order, various interested parties, like the federal and provincial governments, were forced to declare whether or not they had claims against the industry related to smuggling. At that point, the Government of Canada increased its claim from \$1.5 billion to \$4.3 billion. And several provinces, with no alternative but to declare their positions, jumped in with claims for about another \$10 billion.

For more information on smuggling, see: *Illegal Pathway to Illegal Profits: The Big Cigarette Companies and International Smuggling* [www.tobaccofreekids.org/campaign/global/framework/docs/Smuggling.pdf](http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/campaign/global/framework/docs/Smuggling.pdf).

## The 'Light' and 'Mild' consumer fraud

**I**n 1976, Canadian tobacco companies introduced 'light' and 'mild' brands. Heavy advertising attracted consumers with promises of full "taste" or "satisfaction" with "low tar".



*This ad for Player's Light from Imperial Tobacco in Canada in the 1970s says "All the experience of Player's in a milder cigarette"*

The industry's marketing intent was clear: these brands were pitched at smokers who were worried about the damage cigarettes were doing to their health, but who were too addicted to quit. In less than 10 years, these brands captured 40% of the Canadian market. Today, 58% of current smokers are 'light' and 'mild' users.<sup>86</sup>

Unfortunately, as the public health community only fully realized in the 1990s, 'light' and 'mild' cigarettes are just as hazardous as regular cigarettes. 'Light' and 'mild' products simply do not offer reduced risks. The tobacco industry uses the same tobacco in 'light' brands as in regular ones, but dilutes the smoke by putting tiny ventilation holes in the cigarettes. Smokers of 'light' cigarettes block these holes with their fingers and puff harder to get their needed dose of nicotine. As a result, they inhale the same amount of cancer-causing tars and other toxins as they would with full strength cigarettes. Doctors are also noticing an increase in cancers of the lower lung, thought to be caused by smokers sucking harder on their 'light' and 'mild' cigarettes.

The tobacco industry kept the government in the dark about its own internal studies of human smoking behaviour that show tar intake from 'light' cigarettes is the same as the tar intake from 'regular' cigarettes. In the absence of critical research known to the industry, the federal government pressed ahead with a series of toxic emissions values being printed on the side of cigarette packs.

<sup>86</sup> Health Canada. Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Survey 2005 (CTUMS). [www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/tobac-tabac/research-recherche/stat/ctums-esutc/2005/ann\\_summary-sommaire\\_e.html](http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/tobac-tabac/research-recherche/stat/ctums-esutc/2005/ann_summary-sommaire_e.html)

The toxic constituents' panel grossly misrepresented what smokers were inhaling. These numbers, on cigarette packs to this day, imply that there is a scientific basis to the claim that 'light' and 'mild' brands are less harmful than regular ones. This is false.

In 2003, eleven prominent Canadian health officials including several medical officers of health, a group organized by the Non-Smokers' Rights Association, filed a complaint under the *Competition Act* with the federal Competition Bureau. The 600-page complaint alleged that the marketing of 'light' and 'mild' cigarettes constitutes a deceptive trade practice, in common language, a consumer fraud. When the regulatory agency failed to produce a decision after a delay of many months, nine of the complainants challenged the Bureau in the Federal Court of Canada. Finally, after what appeared to be a giant stall that lasted more than three years, the Bureau negotiated a settlement with Canada's three large manufacturers of domestic cigarettes. Arguably, it was the weakest of all remedies to one of the most destructive frauds this country has ever seen. 'Light' and 'mild' descriptors on cigarettes will cease to appear on the packages of these three manufacturers in 2007. But the agreement binds only these three companies.

Was this remedy adequate for a consumer fraud that contributed to or caused thousands of tobacco deaths? Hardly. The Bureau could have initiated a process that would have led to huge fines, corrective advertising, criminal sanctions and even improved industry behaviour. But perhaps in order to avoid litigation, the Commissioner of Competition opted for a sweetheart deal with the pushers.

Fraud and other nasty behaviour is not new for Big Tobacco. In the early 1950s, when more and more research was suggesting that cigarettes cause lung cancer, tobacco companies introduced filters to their cigarettes. They then developed ad campaigns pitching filters as protection for people's throats by making the smoke "delightfully sweet and cool." Some even said the filtered brands offered "health protection" to smokers.

With the du Maurier  
**FILTER TIP**  
the most sensitive throat  
is guarded



The exclusive du Maurier filter tip prevents smoker's throat the common sense way—before the smoke leaves the cigarette. It effectively retains irritants which must be present even in the finest smoke and so makes it delightfully sweet and cool. It is not only better for you, but so much more enjoyable.

Smoke to your throat's content

**du MAURIER**

WITH THE FILTER TIP

*This Imperial Tobacco ad was published in 1954 to reassure smokers in the face of increasing concern about the risks of smoking.*

Glantz et al., in *The Cigarette Papers*, say:

These claims were not based on proof of 'health protection'; indeed, some filter brands had higher tar deliveries than unfiltered products from the same manufacturer and smoke from filter cigarettes was shown to be as carcinogenic as smoke from unfiltered brands. Nonetheless, the hype worked, and by 1960 filter brands were well on their way to replacing nonfilter cigarettes in the marketplace.<sup>87</sup>

This fraud is mentioned in both the U.S. Department of Justice/Kessler decision and in B.C.'s alleged claim against Canadian tobacco manufacturers and their parent companies.

For more information on the low tar deception, see the NSRA brochure, "The 'light' and 'mild' consumer fraud," at [www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/pdf/LightMildbrochure.pdf](http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/pdf/LightMildbrochure.pdf). Hard copies are available from the NSRA.

<sup>87</sup> Glantz S, et al. *The Cigarette Papers*. University of California Press, 1996, p. 109.

## Philanthropy and Corporate Social Responsibility

**P**hilanthropy is defined as, "a desire to help mankind as shown by acts of charity."<sup>88</sup> Would it be OK if a group of unrepentant wife beaters offered funding for a battered women's shelter? That won't happen. But if it did, how would the public react if the shelter accepted the money?

Now let's remove the disconnect between this example and the real world. In the decades since the establishment of cigarettes as a "cause" of lung cancer (1962-1964), the tobacco industry used its artful marketing to equate smoking with women's independence/liberation and to dramatically enlarge the epidemic of lung cancer. That market expansion has led to the deaths of millions of women.

*This water tower, erected by British American Tobacco in drought-stricken Niger, was filled with water for the company's public relations photo op, but has been left sitting dry ever since.*



Yet, through philanthropy,<sup>89</sup> we see the tobacco industry donating to – you guessed it – battered women's shelters, and a whole range of women's charities including Toronto's Women's College Hospital, at the time a World Health Organization collaborative centre for women's health. The hospital even installed the president of the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, Rob Parker, on its board of trustees!

And is the example above any different than a hospital taking a donation from Big Tobacco to fund a palliative care unit? A large portion of the dying patients in a palliative care unit are put there by the cigarette industry. You guessed right again. This actually happened. Imperial Tobacco funded the palliative care unit of Montreal's Royal Victoria Hospital. For Big Tobacco, philanthropy is:

- a public relations tool,
- a means to create political influence,
- an insurance policy.

The tobacco industry uses philanthropy as a public relations tool to suggest Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Big Tobacco hopes that donations will send a message that it is a legitimate member of the business community and that it has changed its behaviour. Through philanthropy, Big Tobacco is trying to buy something it desperately wants but can't get through any other means: legitimacy, respect, dependency and insurance. Of course, once it has donated money to a good cause, it doesn't hesitate to toot its own horn. A good example occurred in 2000 when Philip Morris donated \$100 million to, among other things, Tsunami victims and battered women. What it didn't reveal was that it spent more money on an advertising campaign to publicize the philanthropy than it did on the donations themselves.<sup>90</sup>

Using philanthropy to gain political advantage is another strategy. The examples of the unconscionable purchase of political influence by tobacco companies in the Third World are endless. In 2005, BAT paid for the construction of a water tower in the village of Hamdallaye, Niger. Such water towers are rare so the villagers looked forward to its completion. The inauguration was well attended by politicians, business people and journalists who

<sup>88</sup> Webster's New World dictionary. Modern Desk Edition 1971.

<sup>89</sup> For more info, see: BAT in its own words – Behind the mask of corporate social responsibility. [www.ash.org.uk/html/conduct/pdfs/bat2005.pdf](http://www.ash.org.uk/html/conduct/pdfs/bat2005.pdf)

<sup>90</sup> Elliott S. "The Delicate Task of Showing Corporate Concern for Tsunami Victims". New York Times, January 4, 2005.



duly reported on the generosity of BAT. The water flowed freely the day of the grand celebration. However, since that day, not a drop of water has trickled out. Eyewitnesses report that the pumps were never connected to an electrical source and that the tower was filled with water from a tanker truck the night before the event.<sup>91</sup>

If that isn't disgusting enough, there's more...

- Following the devastating tsunami in South-east Asia in December 2004, the Ceylon Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of BAT, handed out mobile tobacco stands to victims in many districts of Sri Lanka free-of-charge. The companies claimed the stands were provided to encourage self-employment.
- In 2004, Pakistan Tobacco Company (PTC), the local subsidiary of BAT, engaged in one of the most extensive tobacco industry public relations blitzes ever seen in South Asia. But the ad that was perhaps the most disgraceful covered PTC's sponsorship of a fleet of mobile dispensaries "that reach out to patients in far flung places who need medical attention". There are photos of someone receiving oxygen and another of a man having his blood pressure checked. The ad boasts that on average the dispensaries treat about 2,000 patients monthly. It fails to mention that hundreds of premature deaths due to PTC products occur in Pakistan monthly.
- Tobacco company donations to health facilities isn't limited to underdeveloped countries. In 2001, in Simcoe, Ontario, the heart of Canada's tobacco growing region, tobacco companies donated \$300,000 to Norfolk General Hospital. Both Rothmans, Benson & Hedges and Imperial Tobacco Canada gave \$100,000. JTI-Macdonald donated \$75,000. And Simcoe Leaf Tobacco

gave \$25,000. The tobacco industry has donated millions to Canadian hospitals, more than \$630,000 by Imperial Tobacco Canada in 2005 alone. Interestingly, when the NSRA has invited hospitals to participate in tobacco-related advocacy projects, with but one or two exceptions over 30 years, hospitals have never participated.



*This ad by the Pakistan Tobacco Company, which is owned by the same parent company that owns Imperial Tobacco Canada, fails to mention that its products cause much of the disease that make the dispensaries necessary.*

Finally, grants, contributions and donations create a valuable insurance policy for the tobacco industry. Historically, when the tobacco transnationals face legislative or regulatory threats, the companies call on those who have received their support and ask them for help in fighting off the latest legislative encroachment. The recipients of funding know that if they don't come to the aid of their tobacco patron, the financial support will cease. When the battle for Canada's legislation to severely restrict tobacco advertising and sponsorship, the *Tobacco Act*, was underway in 1996, it was tobacco-sponsored Canadian arts groups under the direction of tobacco PR groups that led the fight in opposition to this landmark health legislation. Time and time again, when the going gets tough, the cigarette manufacturers cash in on their insurance policies.

<sup>91</sup> Hamelin J. "Targeted by multinationals: Tobacco control making headway in Africa," Info Tabac, May 2006. <http://www.smoke-free.ca/info-tabac/may2006.htm>

<sup>92</sup> Simpson D. Pakistan: weapons of mass deception. News analysis. Tobacco Control 2004; 13:7. <http://tc.bmjournals.com/cgi/content/full/13/1/7>

<sup>93</sup> Haché T. "Medical Silence: In Norfolk, the medical community is silent in the smoke-free bylaw debate," The Simcoe Reformer, 13 December 2002, p. 3.

<sup>94</sup> Imperial Tobacco Canada. "Our Community Investment," 2006 Corporate Brochure. [http://www.imperialtobacco.ca/onewebca/sites/IMP\\_5TUJVVZ.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/D19D2D67D58F4A84C12571E6006D2134?opendocument&SID=&DTC=](http://www.imperialtobacco.ca/onewebca/sites/IMP_5TUJVVZ.nsf/vwPagesWebLive/D19D2D67D58F4A84C12571E6006D2134?opendocument&SID=&DTC=)

## Has Big Tobacco changed its behaviour? Has the tiger changed its stripes?

**C**onsider this recent denial of risks. In 2006, after the U.S. Surgeon General issued his press release and report on second-hand smoke (SHS) saying "the debate is over," after the federal government forced Canadian manufacturers to warn of illness and death from SHS on tobacco packages and the tobacco industry declined the opportunity to challenge the accuracy of these warnings in court, Benjamin Kemball, the president of Imperial Tobacco Canada, denied the relationship between SHS and disease. "There have been studies but no uniformity among those studies in terms of the health impact of second-hand smoke. Having said that, we do recognize the nuisance factor."<sup>95</sup>



*Benjamin Kemball*

In an apartment not far from *The Toronto Sun* offices where Kemball addressed the editorial board, Mary Reikie lay dying on her sofa, a result of years of exposure to her husband's smoking. In an article titled "The boss of Imperial Tobacco is 'out of his mind' when he minimizes the dangers of second-hand smoke, says a dying Mary Reikie," columnist Michele Mandel told readers of yet another victim of the tobacco industry.<sup>96</sup>

Perhaps a better known victim is the late Heather Crowe, a non-smoker who was featured in TV ads run by Health Canada. She died in 2006 as a result of the cancer she developed from years of exposure to SHS as a waitress.

<sup>95</sup> Mandel M. "The boss of Imperial Tobacco is 'out of his mind' when he minimizes the dangers of second-hand smoke, says a dying Mary Reikie," *The Toronto Sun*, 22 June 2006, p. 10.

<sup>96</sup> *ibid.*



*The Tobacco Institute in the U.S. ran this full-page ad in 20 major newspapers in 1982 to confuse the public about the risks of second-hand smoke.*

Not everyone who dies of second-hand smoke gets as much attention as Heather Crowe. Most die quietly, their deaths unnoticed. Health Canada estimates that 1,100 Canadians are killed every year from exposure to this air pollutant. Yet, Canada's tobacco industry continues to lobby against smoke-free laws.

As the 1982 ad "Here's what's *now* being said about tobacco smoke in the air" suggests, the behaviour of Big Tobacco has not changed.

# What to DO

## Implementing Tobacco Industry Denormalization (TID)

This report is a modest attempt to give you some understanding of the Smoke Folk behaviour that has led to the devastating expansion of the tobacco epidemic. Because of the limitations of time and space, the picture painted here is necessarily incomplete. Nor should the industry take all of the blame. Canadians, via their governments, time after time, let the industry get away with such outrageous behaviour. Canadians simply have not cared enough to blow the whistle long and hard on the manufacturers.

It's mind boggling when you think about it but consider this. We have had Royal Commissions into the steel, drug, marine and other industries. Even the potato industry. For each of these, documents were pried open and witnesses forced to testify. Yet an industry that Health Canada says kills 37,000 Canadians annually has never been asked to explain its behaviour under oath.

Fortunately, many health officials understand that part of blowing the whistle on the pushers is a health strategy that, justifiably, strips the industry of its normalcy and of its ill-gotten legitimacy. As said earlier, for good reason, the TID health strategy positions Big Tobacco as a rogue industry outside the norms of legitimate business. The payoff? The TID strategy will help pry open political doors for more comprehensive reforms.

What are the components of an activity that would make it an effective TID project?

High marks would go for:

- education of those participating in the activity or event about the role of the industry in the tobacco epidemic;
- creation of mass media coverage that exposes the role of the tobacco industry as the disease vector in the tobacco epidemic, that educates both the public and legislators of the need to focus on the industrial source of the epidemic;
- increased awareness in the community of the public health harm that can flow from support of or involvement with the tobacco industry. You can add other criteria.

A pure TID project, i.e. one that restricts itself to exposing the industry's behaviour, would be worthwhile on its own. But if the initiative manages to combine the implementation of other tobacco control strategies, e.g. protecting children from second-hand smoke in cars, with a TID strategy, the effectiveness of the project would probably be increased. In the example just mentioned, the TID component could be the revelation of tobacco industry documents that reveal a callous industry attitude toward the protection of children in cars.

Now that we know what an effective TID project could accomplish, you might ask whether or not we have any general advice on how to take the fight to the corporate source of the epidemic.

# How to be effective

## 1. Remember the purpose of the TID strategy.

The strategy is to reduce tobacco industry-caused death and disease by showing that this industry operates outside the norms of ethical business and therefore deserves to lose its legitimacy. So ask the question "Does your planned project actually marginalize the industry?"

**2. Ensure that your proposed TID project advances public health.** If it only ridicules or marginalizes the industry, it is probably worthwhile. But if it goes further and supports a particular law reform initiative, great. For example, you may have even greater success if your project also involves a demonstration at your city hall or provincial legislature when a tobacco law is being reviewed.

**3. Get *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals*** by the great American sociologist Saul Alinsky. Visit your library or quality bookstore. He explains how to be very creative with protests, how to take on serious issues with little money and how to have fun doing it.

## 4. Reframe the debate. Look at the industry's strategy and language for the issue.

a. Take the blame-the-victim approach to tobacco control out of the debate. Transfer the responsibility for the epidemic away from individual behaviour ("smoking") to corporate behaviour ("tobacco industry products"). Smokers who were hooked as children are not the cause of the epidemic. Corporations using predatory practices, often illegal practices, must be held responsible.

Therefore, when speaking or writing, reject language like "smoking causes 37,000 deaths a year in Canada;" write or say, "tobacco industry products kill 37,000 Canadians every year." Governments and health agencies have not got this yet. They have to be pressed to change their language.

b. Call tobacco use what it is, a drug addiction, not a "habit," the positioning or spin that the industry has promoted. The mass media is almost always caught by the tobacco industry spin and calls tobacco addiction a "habit". Even health officials who do not understand the issue play into the industry's language.

Therefore, reject language like "This New Year's Day, resolve to break your smoking habit." "Habit" trivializes the problem. Instead, remind editors, columnists and health promoters to write or say "This New Year's, beat your addiction to tobacco. Millions of others have. You can too."

c. Don't let the industry get away with the allegation that health interests are trying to "denormalize smokers" and "denormalize smoking." You will see this in the speeches of tobacco CEOs and in tobacco company annual reports. The industry is trying to reposition the TID strategy as a conflict between smokers and non-smokers, as an attack on smokers.

Don't let the pushers get away with this. Smokers don't want their kids or grandchildren to smoke. Most smokers don't even want to continue smoking themselves. The conflict is not between smokers or non-smokers. The conflict is between the tobacco industry and everyone else.

Therefore, restrict the language of denormalization to tobacco industry behaviour, to tobacco industry denormalization. This is the new strategy. Use "Change the social acceptability of tobacco addiction" to describe any focus on social attitude change or individual behaviour change. In tobacco control activities, restrict the word "denormalization" to repositioning the industry in the eyes of the public.

In short, do not accidentally help the industry by using words and terms that it prefers. Move further up the food chain and attack the real problem, the Smoke Folk who are ruining the lives of both smokers and non-smokers.



**5. Check tobacco company web sites**, especially Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited. Find out which hospital or university in your area accepted money from the pushers. Check company executives or board directors in *Who's Who*. Or just google the name of the person. Find out on which hospital, university or non-profit board he or she volunteers. Then start protesting the connection.

**6. Make sure your research is accurate.** Do not cut corners. (We hope this publication measures up.)

**7. Personalize your protest.** One of Alinsky's rules is "Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it." It's very personal when the industry hooks someone's kids. Or when a teen becomes addicted, goes on to become a mother or father and, then, is taken out of this world by cigarette-caused lung cancer in his or her 40's. Leaving kids behind is very personal. It's also very personal when surgeons remove half a face to deal with tobacco industry-caused oral cancer.

So consider taking your protest right into the personal lives of the Smoke Folk. If they won't answer questions at the office, why not question them in front of their home as part of a protest. Let the neighbours of Smoke Folk know what the guy next door does for a living. If you have a press release or other printed material, put it in the mail slot of the neighbours.

Tip the news media off that you are going to try to talk to Mr. or Ms. Smoke Folk where he or she lives and relaxes. After all, his or her work takes disease, discomfort and embarrassment into the living rooms and bedrooms of over 37,000 Canadian families a year. Turn the tables.

Remember, respect property. Obey the law. Peaceful demonstrations are part of the fabric of social reform of democratic societies everywhere. Use them.

**8. Don't limit the personalization process to Smoke Folk.** Personalization as a social change tactic can be directed at the university president who defends taking tobacco money, the chair of the

hospital who, tobacco company cheque in hand, builds a new hospital wing for Big Tobacco to fill, etc. The spotlight could be directed at the lobbyists for Big Tobacco who undermine critical new tobacco control laws while sitting on the board of directors of a respected health charity. Attention should also be paid to industry fronts or pseudoscientists.

**9. Don't waste your energy on projects that dead-end.** Don't bother writing to tobacco executives or others who work for the industry unless the letter will prepare the ground for later advocacy. Normally, such a letter will never see the light of day. Write your letter to someone who may be politically accountable for his or her reaction. Or to a letters-to-the-editor column where it may be published.

Whatever letter or petition you send, have it lay the groundwork for a subsequent action. So, if you write a letter to your Member of Parliament or to a member of your provincial legislature (MPP or MLA), ask for an answer to specific questions. And, ask for a follow up meeting. Then be prepared to ask him or her to support specific reforms.

**10. Check out these web sites for more information.** The NSRA does not necessarily support the ideas expressed on these sites:

[www.bigtabaccosucks.org](http://www.bigtabaccosucks.org)

[www.smoke-fx.com](http://www.smoke-fx.com)

[www.leavethepackbehind.ca](http://www.leavethepackbehind.ca)

[www.tobaccofreecampus.com](http://www.tobaccofreecampus.com)

[www.bandisplays.ca](http://www.bandisplays.ca)

<http://tobaccofreeottawau.blogharbor.com>

[www.thetruth.com](http://www.thetruth.com)

[www.realitycheckny.org](http://www.realitycheckny.org)

[www.jeliowa.org](http://www.jeliowa.org)

[www.getoutraged.com](http://www.getoutraged.com)

[www.ignitegeneration.org](http://www.ignitegeneration.org)

[www.gyatnetwork.org](http://www.gyatnetwork.org)

[www.therealmessagene.net](http://www.therealmessagene.net)

[www.getrealcolorado.com](http://www.getrealcolorado.com)

[www.generationfree.com](http://www.generationfree.com)

# Tobacco Industry Denormalization in *action*

Here are some examples of projects with elements of TID carried out by youth.



HCAAT's mission is to expose Big Tobacco and its manipulation of youth through the examination of the industry's behaviour.

Youth from the Hamilton Crew for Action Against Tobacco took to the street to celebrate World No Tobacco Day in 2006. In a mock funeral for Big Tobacco, pallbearers, complete with a police escort, carried a cardboard coffin filled with cigarette packs to city hall where a eulogy was given.



*"United We Breathe Strong" March,  
Hamilton, Ontario, May 31, 2006*

This was followed by speeches, and concluded with a press conference. The youth parading behind the casket wore matching t-shirts that read, "44 people die needlessly each day in Ontario from tobacco industry products."



*HCAAT's mission is to expose Big Tobacco and its manipulation of youth through the examination of the industry's behaviour.*

Why is this Tobacco Industry Denormalization? Tobacco industry products, not smoking, were said to be responsible for the needless deaths of 44 people in Ontario every day. Instead of focusing on the individual behaviour of smoking, demonstrators held the industry responsible. The coffin, complete with pallbearers, is the exact opposite image of glamour and excitement that the industry wants you to associate with its products.

Check out HCAAT at [www.unfilteredfacts.ca](http://www.unfilteredfacts.ca) for examples of tobacco industry denormalization.

## Ad hoc group protest

**A**t the 2005 national tobacco control conference in Ottawa, student delegates seized a window of opportunity to carry out some hard-edged advocacy, precisely what Big Tobacco deserves. They organized a rally at the World Exchange Plaza, the office complex that houses the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council (CTMC). Using a sound system and a prop of a tobacco 'power wall,' they called on the federal minister of health to implement a national ban on 'power walls,' a goal of huge importance.

Students lay in the plaza while chalk outlines were made of their bodies, simulating tobacco deaths. Youth organizers rallied the crowd. Students went into the amphitheatre and obtained protest cards to be delivered to the minister. The rally was edgy and created controversy. And, as they learned, the CTMC folk were very upset.

Organizers of this event did many things right. The goal of the rally, a national 'power wall' ban, was important. The industry was exposed and the rally was newsworthy.



*"The tobacco industry wants to prevent you from hearing, seeing and talking about the scientific facts..."*

industry. In the past two years, Commando oxygène has sent out 108 teams representing approximately 1,000 students to do over 500 "counter-attacks" all over Québec.

Why is this tobacco industry denormalization? The street theatre scenarios tell the public the truth about tobacco industry deception. And they are newsworthy and interesting. Youth targets are turning the tables and targeting the predators. The reference to "See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil" throws a spotlight on what the industry does not want the public to know about both tobacco risks and corporate misbehaviour.

Learn more about Commando oxygène at [www.cqts.qc.ca/commando](http://www.cqts.qc.ca/commando)

## Commando oxygène



**T**he Québec Council on Tobacco and Health funds Commando oxygène teams across Québec to perform street theatre. Five short scenarios are available for Commando oxygène teams to perform unannounced in public places. Each delivers a different message pertaining to the menace of second-hand tobacco smoke or the trickery of the tobacco

## The Wide Awake Generation Against Tobacco



**W**ide Awake Generation Against Tobacco is a community initiative led by youth facilitated by the Durham Region Health Department in Ontario. In a video ad that it produced, a number of youth are standing in a cemetery while a young woman comments:

During the 20th century, war caused over 61 million military and civilian deaths. During the same time, tobacco industry products killed over 71 million people. Instead of recalling the defective product, tobacco industries marketed their products as normal. They even paid to advertise their products in kids' movies, like *Superman* and *Men in Black*. Each year, we remember the lives lost to war. But we continue to ignore an industry that is even more deadly. We want to know. Is this normal?

This video ad has two powerful themes. One is a health risk message. The other is pure TID. It places the responsibility for tobacco deaths on the industry. If this ad reached significant audiences, it would get high marks as a TID project.



*E-BUTT president Tyler Ward  
(photo credit: Mike Ghenu, The Varsity)*

## E-BUTT (Education – Bringing Youth Tobacco Truths)

**E**-BUTT is an organization formed to educate youth about the deceptive practices of the tobacco industry. As mentioned on page 37, as this report was being finalized, E-BUTT had a stunning victory. It had been engaged in a campaign to encourage the University of Toronto to divest all of its tobacco stocks and to approve a policy that would prevent the university from investing in and receiving donations and research grants from tobacco companies.

According to E-BUTT, U of T has \$10.5 million invested in tobacco companies, including Japan Tobacco International, Altria Group (Philip Morris) and Rothmans Inc.<sup>97</sup> In January 2007, E-BUTT held a news conference to publicize its University of Toronto Tobacco Divestment Report. The event received impressive media coverage and

publicized the fact that 23 institutions across North America, including the renowned universities Brown, Harvard School of Public Health and Stanford, have already divested tobacco industry securities.<sup>98</sup> The E-BUTT campaign was putting pressure on a prestigious educational institution to distance itself from the tobacco industry.

Why was this tobacco industry denormalization? The report written by E-BUTT was well-researched, fact-based. It pointed out that U of T is in direct violation of its own investment policy. U of T accepts Yale University's concept of social injury for determining where to invest. The Yale policy prevents investment in a company whose activities have an injurious impact on consumers, employees or other persons. E-BUTT's press conference was reported in *The Toronto Star*, *The Toronto Sun*, and student newspapers across Canada. The campaign highlighted how hypocritical it is for a university, known around the world for its medical and public health programs, to invest in companies that are the source of a preventable epidemic.

E-BUTT, led by student Tyler Ward, now has a stunning national precedent in public health to its credit.

<sup>97</sup> **Education-Bringing Youth Tobacco Truths.** "Student Group Petitions University of Toronto to Divest from Tobacco Industry," Press Release, 16 January 2007. [www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/January2007/15/c5467.html](http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/January2007/15/c5467.html)

<sup>98</sup> *ibid.*




**exposé**

EXAMINEZ LES FAITS • EXPRIMEZ VOS IDÉES  
EXPOSEZ LA VÉRITÉ AU SUJET DU TABAGISME

e x p o s é

EXAMINE THE FACTS • EXPRESS YOUR THOUGHTS  
EXPOSE THE TRUTH ABOUT TOBACCO

**E**xposé is a youth-led tobacco awareness project, facilitated by Ottawa Public Health, where youth educate other young people about the dangers of tobacco and the tobacco industry's manipulative tactics. Participants are encouraged to "Examine the facts, express your thoughts, expose the truth about tobacco." Every year exposé holds a mass media contest where local students compete creatively to design an ad that is published in local newspapers



*"Unmask the Tobacco Industry"*  
by Pascale Gagnon-Arpin -- École secondaire publique  
De La Salle, 2005 mass media contest winner.

and on buses that are part of Ottawa's transportation system. In 2005, the theme was "Unmask the Tobacco Industry" and the ad shown here won the competition.

Why is this Tobacco Industry Denormalization? The project gets students thinking about the role played by the industry in addicting youth. In this case, the winning design reveals the true face behind the facade of corporate social responsibility with which the tobacco industry tries to fool the public. Behind the mask of the good corporate citizen the true face of Big Tobacco is revealed.

Learn more about exposé at [www.smokefreeottawa.com/expose](http://www.smokefreeottawa.com/expose)

## Tobacco-Free Campus

**T**obacco-Free Campus is a movement led by post-secondary students across Alberta who are concerned about the health and well-being of their fellow students. In 2004 and 2005 students at campuses across the province participated in a coordinated "Drop Dead" demonstration. Organizers tried to mobilize 3,400 volunteers on different campuses (that's the number of people who die every year in Alberta from tobacco-related diseases) to simulate tobacco deaths to protest against Big Tobacco. Posters advertising the 2005 event listed the many reasons why youth were mobilizing to take on the tobacco companies:

- Big Tobacco targets youth and young adults (that's us!) in Canada because they need "replacement smokers" to replace all the people they've been killing
- Over four million people worldwide will die prematurely from tobacco this year!
- Big Tobacco is aggressively marketing to people in developing nations in Asia, Africa and South America
- Tobacco is the leading preventable cause of illness and death in Canada



Why is this Tobacco Industry Denormalization? Having a large group of people dramatize tobacco industry-caused deaths communicates the message that the tobacco industry is not a normal group of companies doing normal business activities.

The industry, not individual behaviour, is being held responsible for thousands of deaths in Alberta each year. This activity tells the truth about the industry's role in the tobacco epidemic.

See [www.tobaccofreecampus.com](http://www.tobaccofreecampus.com) for more info about what is happening on post-secondary campuses in Alberta.

## Now, do some brainstorming on possible TID projects

Here's another rule of effective advocacy. And Saul Alinsky underlines it. Don't forget to have fun when you carry out your activity. Think about how the tobacco industry has intruded into the lives of others and how its executives have made millions of people uncomfortable. Or worse, killed them. So have fun figuring out how to make tobacco executives, their friends and their fronts uncomfortable. That's part of the shunning or marginalization process.

What can you do to tell the truth about what the pushers are up to? Or what those who jump in bed with them are up to? What can you do to embarrass them, mock them, turn over the rock under which they may be hiding? Here are a few ideas to start. You can think up better ones.

- The manufacturers are always dreaming up new ways to improve their image. One is promoting phony youth prevention programmes to persuade the public that tobacco companies are not trying to hook young people. If you discover that organizations in your area have endorsed Operation I.D., encourage them to drop their endorsement. And to publicize the decision.
- The industry knows its credibility sucks. That's why it uses front groups and third parties to speak for it. Keep your eye on the news. When something walks and talks like Big Tobacco, like Operation I.D., it's probably the industry in disguise. Do your research and, if justified, expose it.
- 'Power Wall' displays are designed to normalize cigarettes for young people and to encourage former smokers to relapse and rejoin the tobacco market. If you are in parts of Canada where 'power walls' are still legal, organize a demonstration in

support of a ban on 'power walls'. Ask for a 'Power Wall' kit and video from the Non-Smokers' Rights Association to gain a greater understanding of the importance of 'power walls'. Don't forget to contact the news media.

- Rothmans Inc. is the only publicly traded tobacco company in Canada. Plan to attend their next annual meeting always held in July. Buy some Rothmans Inc. stock so you will be able to gain entrance. Nobody says you can't have fun when confronting businessmen with no consciences, bad dudes sitting on stage, very proper, in their pin-stripe suits. Figure out some good questions. Let the media know you will be there.
- Organize protests at teachers' conventions. Teachers are important role models for student behaviour. Ask why teacher pension funds invest millions in tobacco stocks. If the University of Toronto decides to divest, why not teacher pension funds? Again, inform the media.
- Find out if your university or college accepts tobacco money in any form. Find out if it invests school money in tobacco stocks. If it does, mount a campaign to change its policy.
- Don't forget demonstrations in front of the constituency offices of politicians. Make them noisy but polite. They make great visuals for TV. Ask questions about double standards and hypocrisy. Ask why the health ministry or department preaches one thing while another ministry or department supports the opposite.

For example, if tobacco is the leading cause of preventable death and government policy is to discourage its use, why does the government invite tobacco growers to join international trade missions aimed at selling the epidemic in the Third World?

- Be aware that funders of youth tobacco control initiatives may try to block TID (i.e. activities that target the industry). Learn to surmount these blocks, just as health professionals do.

For example, when physicians are unable to endorse hard-hitting advocacy campaigns wearing their organizational hats, they often endorse advocacy activities as individuals where the organization cannot restrict their freedom to speak out. Youth must learn to either reject funding with unacceptable strings attached or learn how to work around constraints. A good advocacy project might involve challenging a funder over TID constraints.

Now, brainstorm and come up with even better ideas.



*This Greek tobacco product is called "Santé", meaning "health". This reminds us that tobacco companies will go to almost any length to deceive their customers. It seems appropriate to end this report with another whopper of a lie.*

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[www.newdesigngroup.ca](http://www.newdesigngroup.ca)**



For decades, Big Tobacco told the public that it had not been proven that cigarettes cause any disease or any death. While arguing this position publicly, here is what was being said behind close doors:

"If we admit that smoking is harmful to 'heavy' smokers, do we not admit that BAT [parent of Imperial Tobacco Limited, now Imperial Tobacco Canada] has killed a lot of people each year for a very long time? Moreover, if the evidence we have today is not significantly different from the evidence we had five years ago, might it not be argued that we have been 'willfully' killing our customers for this long period? Aside from the catastrophic civil damage and governmental regulation which would flow from such an admission, I foresee serious criminal liability problems."\*

This report asks why aren't these people in the slammer.

\*Tobacco executive J. Kendrick Wells III,  
see page 15 of this report.

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